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WARRANTS IN BOND-WARRANT UNITS: 
A SURVEY AND ASSESSl\IENT 
Henry B. Reiling* 
T HE publicly owned stock purchase warrant, an instrument of mischief in the early part of this century, has recently reap-
peared on the American financial stage. The aggressive use of stock 
purchase warrants in conglomerate financings in the late 1960's sug-
gested to some that the warrant was indeed an irresponsible creation. 
But more recently, the major 1970 bond-warrant offering by the rep-
utable American Telephone and Telegraph Company imparted a new 
respectability to the instrument.1 Moreover, for the first time since 
the 1930's, the New York Stock Exchange has admitted warrants to 
trading, and all eleven of the presently listed instruments2 were issued 
by leading companies. The warrant's life cycle in this century-abuse, 
disuse, misuse, and now a new respectability-makes it appropriate 
to examine the present implications of its use for the modern financial 
community. 
This Article surveys the warrant in the context of a bond-warrant 
unit (the typical medium of issuance), and in four main subdivisions 
assesses (I) the warrant's role in corporate finance, and several major 
implications and features of its use today for (II) shareholders of the 
prospective issuer, (III) warrant holder, and (IV) issuer. The present 
status of the warrant as a highly significant mode of financing re-
quires that particular attention be given to the justification for the 
issuance of warrants in the light of earlier authoritative criticism, and 
to the tax consequences and concepts now attending their use. For-
tunately, several undesirable features of early warrant use are dis-
appearing because of responsible corporate practice, but certain 
additional potential abuses need to be foreclosed. Arguably, too, 
• Associate Professor of Business, Columbia University. (Visiting Associate Professor 
of Business, Harvard University, 1972-73.) Member of the New York Bar. A.B. 1960, 
Northwestern University; M.B.A. 1962, Harvard University; J.D. 1965, Columbia Uni-
versity.-Ed. 
I. For $100 per unit, A.T. & T. offered to shareholders of record on April 10, 
1970, rights to purchase a $100 face amount 8¾ % debenture maturing in the year 
2000, together with five-year warrants to purchase two shares of common stock at $52 
per share. The total offering involved $1,569,327,000 in debt and warrants to purchase 
31,386,540 shares. In July 1970, underwriters led by Morgan Stanley & Co. sold the 
unsubscribed units ($35,931,100 face amount of debt) to the public at $115.75 per unit. 
MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, !NC., MOODY'S PUBUC UTILITY MANUAL 1169 (1970). 
2. See N.Y. Stock Exchange Transactions, Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 1971, at 33-34; N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 14, 1971, at 68, 70, 76. 
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certain concepts and conclusions in the tax area need to be reaffirmed 
while others should be modified or replaced. 
I. ROLE IN CORPORATE FINANCE 
In order to identify the premises and framework on which this 
analysis and its conclusions are based, consideration must first be 
given to the warrant's characteristics and history, and to the forces 
contributing to its present popularity. 
A. Characteristics 
Financial custom has evolved and hardened to the point that a 
warrant (stock purchase warrant) can be defined as a transferable 
option created pursuant to an agreement by which a corporation 
binds itself to deliver corporate securities upon receiving the war-
rant certificate and a specified consideration (the exercise price) on 
or before a stipulated date (the expiration date) that is more than 
one year subsequent to the date of issuance.8 Essentially, then, the 
warrant is a long-lived option to buy specified corporate securities. 
For example, in May 1971, Chrysler Financial Corporation issued 
warrants to purchase 1.8 million shares of Chrysler Corporation's 
common stock to the public.4 Each warrant expired at the end of 
approximately five years and was exercisable at thirty-four dollars 
per share, which was roughly ten per cent above the market price 
(30 5 /8)5 at the time of issuance. Leaving aside considerations of 
leverage,0 it is obvious that the warrant's inherent value depends 
entirely on the prospect that the optioned security will eventually 
increase in value beyond the exercise price. 
3. See Bradford v. Crown-Bremson Indus., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 1009, 1012 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1964); Miller v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 223 F. Supp. 790, 794 (S.D.N,Y, 
1963), revd. on other grounds, 337 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964); Tribble v. J.W. Greer Co,, 
83 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (D. Mass. 1949); J. WF.STON &: E. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 
647, 649 (3d ed. 1969); Berle, Convertible Bonds and Stock Purchase Warrants, 36 
YALE L.J. 649 (1927). 
The terms "warrant" and "stock subscription warrant" are occasionally used as 
synonyms. This practice is confusing since the latter is also occasionally used as a 
synonym for "rights" (defined in the text accompanying notes 29-36 infra). Happily, 
the term "stock subscription warrant" appears to be disappearing. 
4. These warrants were issued as part of a 90 million dollar financing whereby 
underwriters sold to the public 90,000 units priced at $1000 each, with each unit 
consisting of one 7¾% subordinated debenture (face value $1000) plus warrants to pur-
chase twenty shares of its parent Chrysler's common stock. After approximately three 
months the warrants could be detached from the debentures and separately transferred, 
Chrysler Financial Corp., Prospectus, May 11, 1971, at I. 
5, Id. at 42. 
6. See notes 40-47 infra and accompanying text. 
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Only a modicum of statutory and case law deals with or influences 
the issuance and characteristics of warrants. For example, the es-
pecially relevant Delaware corporation law7 does not explicitly men-
tion warrants, although it does expressly authorize the issuance of 
"rights or options" of any duration.8 However, since warrants are 
options, their issuance is lawful in Delaware.9 In Delaware and else-
where, significant consequences flow from the fact that the owner of 
an option is not yet an owner of the underlying stock:10 that is to say, 
the warrant owner would not have voting rights, rights to dividends, 
or a claim on assets upon liquidation-unless the warrant agreement 
itself created such rights. Warrants must be registered along with 
the underlying stock under the Securities Act of 193311 and under 
most state Blue Sky laws.12 As with other securities, the essential 
terms and effects must be disclosed; but neither the Securities and 
Exchange Commission nor such careful state regulatory agencies as 
those of California and Ohio prescribe terms for the warrant. The 
investment securities provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code 
specify no special characteristics for the warrant; its qualification as 
a "security" is judged by the same criteria as other instruments.13 
The dearth of law directly influencing the provisions of the war-
rant14 permits the relevant parties-the issuer, undenvriter, and in-
7. It has been reported that 60,000 to 70,000 companies are incorporated in Dela-
ware. Wall St. J., June 30, 1971, at 1, col. 5. As of Dec. 31, 1966, thirty-five per cent 
of the corporations whose stock was listed on the New York Stock Exchange were 
Delaware corporations. Delaware's closest rivals were New York with twelve per cent 
and New Jersey with six per cent. Arsht & Stapleton, Delaware's New General Corpora-
tion Law: Substantive Changes, 23 Bus. LAw. 75, 93 (1967). 
8. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (1953). The statutory language "rights or options" 
could be more precise. Rights are not distinct from options. Rights, warrants, calls 
and conversion provisions are all options. See notes 29-39 infra and accompanying 
text. 
9. Forman v. Chesler, 39 Del. Ch. 484, 490, 167 A.2d 442, 445 (1961). See also Wise 
v. Universal Corp., 93 F. Supp. 393, 395 (D. Del. 1950). 
IO. See, e.g., Lisman v. Milwaukee, L.S. & W. Ry., 161 F. 472, 477, 480 (E.D. Wis. 
1908), affd. per curiam, 170 F. 1020 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 214 U.S. 520 (1909). Cf. 
Helvering v. San Joaquin Fruit & Inv. Co., 287 U.S. 496, 498 (1936) (option to buy 
real property). 
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1970); SEC, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 3210 
(April 9, 1947) (letter of Baldwin B. Bane, Director, Corporation Finance Division, re-
garding registration of certain warrants). 
12. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 25019, 25110 (West Supp. 1972); N.Y. GEN. Bus. 
LAw §§ 352, 359-e (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1971). 
13. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-l02(l)(a) & Comment. 
14. The listing requirements of the New York Stock Exchange are not law, but 
they will influence the characteristics imparted to warrants by some issuers. They 
state, in part, that warrants must be registered, must give a claim on the common 
stock of the listing company, must not entitle the holder to the privileges of common 
stockholders (including voting, dividends, pre-emptive rights), and must afford tlle 
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vestors-great flexibility in drafting the terms of their contract. On 
the other hand, financial practice over time has imparted a general 
profile to warrants. 
A warrant typically has the following characteristics:15 (1) it repre-
sents an option on common stock;16 (2) it possesses a fixed exercise 
price; (3) it must be exercised with cash; (4) the expiration date is 
five or ten years subsequent to the date of issuance; (5) it cannot be 
redeemed by the issuer; (6) it has substantial protection against dilu-
tion;17 (7) it has no voting rights; (8) it has no right to dividends; and 
(9) it has no claim on assets in liquidation. While instances of voting 
rights, rights to dividends, and rights on liquidation are virtually 
nonexistent,18 there are numerous deviations from the other norms in 
individual cases. Several issues have lives of fifteen to twenty-five 
years,19 and even perpetual warrants are outstanding;20 some issues 
usual protection against dilution. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Company Manual, 
Sept, 30, 1971, § B6, at B-124. 
15. Although the authorities identifying these warrant characteristics relate to 
publicly traded warrants, these features are also common to privately placed warrant!!, 
with two exceptions. First, such warrants possess restrictions oil transfer to remain 
within the "private placement" exemption from registration for "transactions by an 
issuer not involving a public offering." Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) 
(1970). Second, the limited marketability of the privately placed warrant reduces, but 
does not eliminate, the warrant's leverage value. See note 47 infra, 
16. In the balance of this Article it will be assumed that the underlying or op• 
tioned security is common stock. Any exception will be clearly indicated. The term 
"common" will often be used as a synonym for "common stock." 
17. The warrant agreement typically contains an antidilutiort provision that 
operates on the theory that the warrant holder has a claim similar to that of a 
common stockholder rather than a claim on a fixed percentage of the company. The 
warrant's claim on common increases when stock dividends or stock splits occur, or 
when common is made available at less than the e.xercise price. Ordinarily there is no 
protection against dilution caused by the issuance of common at less than the 
warrant's exercise price pursuant to employee stock option plans. See, e.g., The Grey• 
hound Corp., Consent Statement, January 1'7, 1970, at 80-82 (agreement with General 
Host Corp. involving Armour &: Co.). 
18. Arguably, the so-called Series C convertible preferred stock of Kinney Services, 
Inc., can be styled a voting, dividend-receiving warrant with liquidation rights, Each 
share of the convertible preferred is entitled to a dividend of five cents per share per 
year, and it has one-half vote per share, The stock does not permit the acquisition of 
common during the first six months, but for the next ten years stock can be acquired 
in either of the following two ways: each share plus $37 entitles one to a share of 
common; sixteen shares of Series C entitle the holder to one share of common (no cash 
is required). After ten years, the warrant feature expires, and common can be acquired 
only by tendering sixteen shares of Series C. The stock is redeemable, but redemption 
(at $2.50 per share) cannot take place for ten years. STANDARD &: POOR'S CORP., STANDARD 
CORPORATION DESCRIPTIONS F-K 8206 ijune-July 1971) [Hereinafter STANDARD CORP, 
DESCRIPTIONS]. 
19. E.g., Lerner Stores issue of August 1967 (fifteen years), id. at L-0 1767 (Dec. 
19~1-Jan. 1972): Frontier Airlines issue of March 1967 (twenty years), id. at F-K 6940 
(Feb.-March 1972); Rapid American issue of February 1969 (twenty-five years), id. at 
P-S 7187 (Dec. 1971-Jan. 1972). 
20. E.g., Tri-Continental issue of December 1929, id. at T-Z 3969 (Feb.-March 1972), 
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represent a claim on common stock of the issuer's subsidiary or 
parent;21 a few early issues gave a claim on preferred stock; an occa-
sional issue can be called and redeemed by the issuer for a small cash 
payment;22 and often a warrant will be exercisable at prices varying 
either upward28 or downward,24 or by tendering designated outstand-
ing bonds instead of cash.25 Warrants usually trade initially26 on the 
basis of one warrant per share,27 and they are rarely exercised in ad-
vance of the last few days of the warrant's life.28 
Conventions of the financial community differentiate warrants 
from three similar types of options: stock purchase rights, calls, and 
the conversion feature inherent in convertible securities. A stock 
purchase right is a ·written instrument evidencing a privilege that 
21. E.g., Chrysler Financial Corp. issue of May 1971, note 4 supra and accompanying 
text. 
22. In May 1970, Cayman Corp. issued 100,000 units priced to the public at $14.50 
per unit and consisting of two shares of common and one redeemable w;u-rant. Each 
warrant was exercisable ,tt $7.50, expired at the end of five years and was redeemable 
by the company for $0.50 any time after thirteen months following issue. Cayman Corp., 
Prospectus, May I, 1970, at I. 
23. E.g., Indian Head, Inc., warrant issue of May 1965, STANDARD CoRP. DESCRIPTIONS, 
supra note 18, at F-K 6793 (April-May 1972). The warrants were initially exercisable at 
$20 per share and expire in 1990. The sliding scale contained in the warrant agreement 
stipulates that at the end of each five-year period subsequent to the issue the exercise 
price increases by $5. Thus, for instance, from 1985 to 1990 the exercise price will be $40. 
24. See, e.g., Wilson Sporting Goods Co., Prospectus, Oct. 22, 1968, at 23. The com-
pany reserved the right to reduce the warrants' exercise price (initially $20.25 per share) 
on these ten-year warrants by up to one third for not less than twenty-one days. 
A provision giving the issuer the right to reduce the exercise price (usually for a 
limited period of time) is called a "flush" provision. This gives the issuer increased 
control over its capital structure in that the reduction may prompt exercise of the 
warrants. Debt or preferred stock might also be eliminated if it can be tendered at par 
in exercise of the warrants. 
25, See, e.g., LTV Aerospace Corp., PrQspectus, Aug. $, 1968, at 22; The Okonite 
Co., Prospectus, Aug. I, 1~68, a~ 29-;lQ. 
On very rare occasions a warrant is convertible (no cash or security other that\ the 
wamnt need be tendered) under certain circumstances. For examp~e, l\f;\PCO, Inc., war-
r;ints issued in 1964 are exercisable at $9 per share of common through March 1972; 
thereafter each warrant may be exchanged for one-half share of common stock. STANDARD 
CoRP, DESCI\IPTIONS, supra note 18, at L-O 2260 (Aug.-Sept. 1971). 
26. Several circumstances typically increasing the number of sh;ires optioned are set 
forth in note 17 supra. 
27. See New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Company Manual, supra note 14, at B-124. 
28. A detailed empirical study of warrants listed on the American Stock Exchange 
found that most remained µnexercised until shortly before expiration. S. Kassouf, A 
Theory and an Econometric Model for Common Stock Purchase Warrants (Ph.D. Dis-
sertation, Columbia University, 1965; Analytical Publishers Co., 1966). Si;e also Shelton, 
The Relation of the :Price of a Warrant to the Price of Its Associated Stock, FINANCIAL 
ANALYSTS J., May-June 1967, at 143 (pt. 1), July-Aug, 1967, at 88 (pt. 2). Earlier exercise 
was found to occur when the common stock appreciated to three or four times the exer-
cise price. Id. A major reason for exercising warrants near expiration appears to be the 
fact that the leverage component of their value, see notes 40-47 infra and accompanying 
text, would be lost by an earlier exercise, whereas it can be captured by selling the war-
rant in the market place. 
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permits stockholders to purchase shares for a period of days, often at 
a sum less than the market price at declaration. A major distinction 
between rights and warrants is the life of the option. Rights generally 
expire within two to four weeks of issuance,29 whereas warrants ex-
pire after a period of a year or more.80 In addition, the exercise price 
of rights is usually less than the current market price,81 but the exer-
cise price of warrants in a public offering is typically equal to or 
greater than the going price for the common stock.82 Finally, corpo-
rations traditionally issue rights separately (unaccompanied by other 
securities) to existing shareholders at no direct cost to the stock-
holders, 33 whereas corporations almost always receive consideration 
for warrants34 and issue them with fixed-income securities as part of 
an investment unit85 to third parties, who only coincidentally may be 
shareholders.36 Calls, like warrants and rights, are options to buy stock 
at a stipulated price, but they typically expire between ninety days 
and one year from issuance. Moreover, while warrants and rights are 
issued by the corporation, calls are sold by third parties such as the 
corporation's stockholders.87 As a consequence of this difference in 
29. See A. DEWING, A STUDY OF CORPORATION SECURITIFS 414-15 (1934). 
30. Id. Some statutory law is at variance with financial practice. For example, under 
the Delaware corporation law, DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (1953), "rights" and "options" 
may have any exercise period, and the term "warrant" is not mentioned at all. In case 
law the terms "rights" and "warrants" are often used interchangeably. See, e.g., Forman 
v. Chesler, 39 Del. Ch. 484, 167 A.2d 442 (1961); Gibson v. Commissioner, 133 F,2d 308 
(2d Cir. 1943), petition for cert. dismissed, 320 U.S. 805 (1944). 
31. See B. GRAHAM & D. DoDD, SECURITY ANALYSIS 636 (2d ed. 1940) [hereinafter 
GRAHAM & DoDD, 2d ed.]. Unless the rights arc exercisable below the going market price, 
the holder would have little incentive to exercise (other than the retention of his own• 
ership percentage and the avoidance of brokerage commissions) and consequently the 
financing would fail. 
32. In a private placement the exercise price is often below the market price to 
compensate for the limited liquidity of both the warrant and optioned stock. CJ. note 47 
infra. 
Where the bond portion of the unit is issued at a discount and can be used at face 
value to exercise the warrants, it can be argued that the effective exercise price of the 
warrant is less than the stated exercise price. Using this rationale, the exercise price of 
many warrants in units where the bond can be used to exercise the warrant is less than 
the common's going market price. 
33. There may be an indirect cost extracted by the income tax. See notes 246-49 infra 
and accompanying text. 
34. See text accompanying notes 124-30, 197-98 infra. 
35. B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. CoTILE, SECURITY ANALYSIS 656 (4th ed. 1962) [herein• 
after GRAHAM & DODD, 4th ed.]; Hayes & Reiling, Sophisticated Financing Tool: Tha 
Warrant, HARv. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1969, at 140. 
36. The best summary of the differences between rights and warrants appearing in 
case law is Judge Wyatt quoting Professor Dewing, note 29 supra, in Miller v. General 
Outdoor Advertising Co., 223 F. Supp. 790, 794-95, (S.D.N.Y. 1963), revd. on other 
grounds, 337 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964). 
37. B. MALKIEL & R. QUANDT, STRATEGIES AND RATIONAL DECISIONS IN TIIE SECURITIES 
0PrION MARKEr 6-7 (1969). Naturally, the cost of a call is one parameter affecting the 
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seller, a warrant, when exercised, affects the corporate balance sheet 
and operations by generating cash or by eliminating debt, but a call 
has no effect at the corporate level. The typical conversion feature 
inherent in a convertible debenture or convertible preferred stock 
gives the holder the option to acquire a stipulated number of shares 
of common stock by surrendering the debenture or preferred stock.38 
Thus, convertibles, like the warrant, affect the balance sheet. How-
ever, unlike the warrant, which is usually exercised with cash and is 
normally transferable independent of other securities, conversion of 
a convertible rarely generates cash, 89 and the option feature cannot 
be separated from the debenture or preferred stock. 
The leverage possibilities of warrants are one of their prime at-
tractions for investors. A warrant exercisable at twenty dollars has 
no exercise or intrinsic value40 when the underlying common is trad-
ing at twenty dollars per share, but if the prospective investor believes 
the stock's market value will double over the next few years, and if 
he can acquire the warrants for one dollar each ( as we shall see, he 
probably cannot), a warrant investment will give a dramatically more 
attractive return than the purchase of common. One thousand dol-
lars will purchase 1,000 warrants for an expected gain of 19,000 
dollars when the common doubles.41 A 1,000 dollar investment in 
common, on the other hand, would purchase only fifty shares. In this 
case, the expected gain is only 1,000 dollars.42 However, experience 
has shown that the leverage is rarely as dramatic as portrayed in the 
leverage value of a warrant, see notes 40-47 infra and accompanying text, during the last 
year of its life. The relationship between the costs of the two types of option would be 
closest when the warrant's exercise price and the common's market price are close, and 
the investor therefore does not have to reduce his leverage by paying for any already 
accrued intrinsic value. 
38. See A. DEWING, supra note 29, at 414. See also GRAHAM &: Donn, 4th ed., supra 
note 35, at 601. 
39. On rare occasions a "convertible" debenture requires a cash payment on conver-
sion. E.g., Nylon Engineering, Inc., 8½% Convertible Subordinate Debentures (Special 
Series), issued March 6, 1970, due March 6, 1980 (privately placed), Nylon Engineering, 
Inc., 1969 Annual Report, at 6. This strange security was convertible at $0.42 per share 
and the holder was obligated to make additional cash payments of $5.58 per share. 
40. The tem1s "exercise value" and "intrinsic value" are synonyms used to identify 
the difference between the e.xercise price and the market value of the underlying 
security, 
41. One thousand shares of common at $40 per share equals $40,000. Since the war-
rant is exercisable at $20, it has an exercise value of $20,000. Subtracting the $1000 cost 
of the warrants, the gain is $19,000 if the warrants are sold. Naturally the holder can 
exercise the warrant if he so desires. In this event he will receive common stock worth 
$40,000 at a cost of $21,000 ($1000 for warrants plus $20,000 exercise price), for a gain 
of $19,000. 
42. Fifty shares at $40 per share equals $2000. Subtracting the $1000 cost of the com-
mon, the gain is $1000. 
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above example. Investors attracted by leverage43 will often value 
publicly traded warrants at between thirty-five and fifty per cent of 
the exercise price, when the warrant's exercise price and the com-
mon's market price are nearly equal and the warrant has a substantial 
remaining life.44 This rule of thumb-which suggests that the war-
rant in our hypothetical situation would sell for approximately eight 
dollars rather than one dollar, thus indicating a leverage, premium, 
or call value of seven to ten dollars46-and other more sophisticated 
valuation techniques46 give investors, as well as investment bankers 
and issuers, a basis for valuing warrants even when the issuer pre-
sently has no comparable warrants outstanding, or when the warrants 
will be part of a private placement.47 
43. Listed warrants with a life of more than ninety days can be purchased on mar-
gin, thereby permitting the especially aggressive investor to add to the leverage already 
inherent in the warrant. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1970), 
pursuant to which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System issued Regula• 
tion T, which governs the extension and maintenance of credit by brokers, dealers, and 
members of national securities exchanges. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-.123 (1972); 2 CCH FED, 
BANKING L. REP. 1l1f 32,621-775 (1972). 
44. See Hayes 8c Reiling, supra note 35, at 148. When the exercise price and market 
price diverge, the rule of thumb often used by investment bankers is forty per cent of 
the exercise price plus or minus (plus, if the common's value is above the exercise price) 
fifty per cent of the difference between the exercise price and the market price. 
These rules of thumb derived from empirical observation summarize the effect of a 
number of factors, the more important of which are leverage, exercise value, the expec• 
tation of the common's future market price, the volatility of the common, the size of 
the warrant issue and the "thinness'' of the market for the warrants, the speculative 
tone of the market in general, the potential dilution of reported earnings through the 
exercise of options, dividend yield on the common, the tightness of money (when margin 
interest rates are high, warrants become relatively more attractive as a leverage medium), 
and the presence of unusual features such as a redemption provision. 
45. The difference between the exercise value of the warrant, see note 40 supra, and 
its market price can conveniently be referred to by such interchangeable terms as its 
"leverage value," "trading value," "call value," or "premium value." There will always 
be a premium value in the warrant so long as there is sufficient time remaining for 
investors to recoup the negative intrinsic value, if any, and possibly achieve a capital 
gain. See Shelton, supra note 28, pt. 2, at 93. 
46. See S. Kassouf, supra note 28: Giguere, Warrants: A. Mathematical Method o/ 
Evaluation, ANAL. J., Nov. 1958, at 17; Samuelson 8c Merton, A. Complete Model of 
Warrant Pricing that Maximizes Utility, INDUS. MANAGEMENT REv., Winter 1969, at 1'7; 
Samuelson, Rational Theory of Warrant Pricing, INDUS. MANAGEMENT REv., Spring 1965, 
at 13; McKean, A Free Boundary Problem for the Heat Equation A.rising from a Prob• 
lem of Mathematical Economics, INDUS. MANAGEMENT REv., Spring 1965, at 32 (Appendix 
to Samuelson); Shelton, supra note 28; Sprenkle, Warrant Prices as Indicators of Expccla• 
tion and Preferences, I YALE EcoN. EssAYS 179 (1961); Van Horne, Warrant Valuation 
in Relation to Volatility and opportunity Costs, INDUS. MANAGEMENT REV,, Spring 1969, 
at 19. 
47. Securities issued under the "private placement" exemption, Securities Act of 
1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970), generally cannot be immediately resold, SEC 
Rule 144, 37 Fed. Reg. 596 (1972). The question therefore arises whether the leverage 
value adheres to privately placed warrants. Given the many factors that influence 
leverage value, see note 44 supra, it is reasonable to conclude that the absence of a 
readily available public market should only affect the amount of the leverage value, 
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There are three major occasions on which corporations issue 
warrants.48 Each involves the use of the warrant as an adjunct in the 
transaction. First, and most importantly, warrants are sold for cash 
to the public or privately placed with institutional investors as part 
of an incentive-financing package, which consists of one or more war-
rants and preferred stock, common stock, ot, most commonly, bonds.49 
These warrants are ordinarily nondetachable for a few weeks, but 
detachable and independently transferable thereaftet.50 Second, in 
corporate acquisitions they are issued as part of a financial package 
in return for outstanding securities of the acquired company.51 Third, 
not its basic existence. Furthermore, the availability of a public market is often only 
delayed, not foreclosed. Some purchasers have a policy of securing a right to demand 
registration. See Reifler, Restricted Securities from the Point of View of the Potential 
Buyer, in How To USE AND INVEST IN LElTER STOCK 42-47 (B. Makela ed. 1970). 
48. There are two other circumstances of minor significance. Warrants have been 
issued to stockholders whose other interests are being reduced or eliminated through 
reorganization under the bankruptcy laws. See, e.g., In re Erie R.R., 37 F. Supp. 237, 
247-48 (N.D. Ohio 1940); H. STURGIS, A NEW CHAl'TER OF ERIE 17, 25 (1948). On rare 
occasions warrants have also been sold separately in private placements. E.g., Modular 
Housing Systems, Inc., INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST, March 9, 1971. In the past few years 
there appears to have been no instance of a public issue involving only warrants wherein 
the optioned stock was the issuer's. There have been very infrequent issues involving 
portfolio stock. See also Truncale v. :Blumberg, 88 F. Supp. 677 (S,D.N.Y.), afjd. per 
curiam sub nom. Truncale v. Scully, 182 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1950) (warrants on parent 
company's stock issued in consideration of executive.employment contracts). 
49. The bond-warrant unit is by far the most common of these financial packages. 
Hayes &: Reiling, supra note 35, at 139. A distant second in significance is the warrant 
in combination with preferred stock. Id. at 140. Units of common stock and warrants 
appear least frequently. Id. 
When an option such as a warrant is issued with a fixed-income security such as a 
bond or preferred stock, the transaction is often referred to as an "incentive financing" 
and the option is often styled an "equity option," "equity kicker,'' or "sweetener." The 
purchaser of the unit is being given the claim on equity as an incentive to acquire 
the fixed-income security, which is the dominant capital-producing security, but because 
of its features and market conditions may be difficult to market by itself. The conver-
sion features in convertible debentures and convertible preferred stock are another type 
of option on equity or sweetener. 
50. The very unusual nondetachable warrant is tlie equivalent of a convertible se-
curity when, as is usually the case, the other security in the unit is the consideration 
used to exercise the warrant. Immediate detachability is most likely to occur when 
common is the othet security, or when the other security is already publicly traded. 
The practice of delayed detachment is characteristic of warrants in combination with 
fixed-income securities. It constitutes an attempt to insulate the elements of the unit 
from unusual forces while the market gets a "fee}." for the new securities and the 
underwriters complete their distribution: In particular, the practice is directed at 
blunting the market effect of those who buy the unit to get the warrant and imme-
diately sell the bond, thereby putting downward and perhaps embarrassing pressure 
(and perhaps costly pressure if the underwriters are "stabilizing" the after market until 
distribution is finished) on the bond's market price. 
51, See, e.g., Gulf&: Western Industries, Inc., Prospectus, July 1, 1968, at I. Gulf &: 
Western unsuccessfully attempted to acquire Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. stock through 
an offer to its stockholders, which included warrants on up to 2.7 million shares of 
Gulf &: Western stock exercisable at $55 per share. 
When used in acquisitions, the warrant is rarely issued by itself. As part of a unit 
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in connection with an initial or early sales of securities, unseasoned 
companies often sell warrants at a nominal value to undenvriters,li2 
B. History 
The first American warrant, and indeed the first true stock pur-
chase warrant identifiable in Anglo-American finance, was issued by 
the Illinois Central Railroad in 1852 in conjunction with a sale of 
bonds to British investors.68 The British origins of warrants are sig-
nificant. British finance had long evidenced both an appreciation of 
leverage and the use of options. Indeed, the characteristics associated 
with warrants and such kindred options on equity as stock purchase 
rights and convertible securities were extant at an early date. The 
ancestor of today's convertible security was utilized by the famous 
East India Company in 1604, when it permitted participants in an 
early voyage to convert their equity interest into a participation in a 
subsequent voyage.64 Roughly one hundred years later, the use of op-
issued for securities it presents the same basic conceptual questions for shareholders, 
issuers, and prospective warrant owners as a bond-warrant unit sold for cash. 
52. See, e.g., Ikor, Inc., Prospectus, Oct. I, 1969, at I; Transmagnetics, Inc., Prospec-
tus, May 27, 1969, at I. When issued in an underwriting context, warrants usually have 
lives of only two to five years. In addition, the warrants often are not exercisable for 
a year or so after the public offering. See, e.g., Transmagnetics, Inc., Prospectus, supra. 
When warrants are issued to underwriters, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
usually views the value represented by the warrants as additional compensation to the 
underwriters. See, e.g., Ikor, Inc., Prospectus, supra; Transmagnetics, Inc., Prospectus, 
supra. Because of this compensation dimension, such warrants are outside the ambit 
of much of this Article. A consideration of the tax treatment of warrants issued to 
underwriters can be found in Fleischer &: Meyer, Tax Treatment of Securities Com• 
pensation: Problems of Underwriters, 16 TAX L. R.Ev. 119, 141-48 (1960). 
53. Putting aside differences in terminology and the presence of a deferred-payment 
feature, the essence of the financing was that the Illinois Central Railroad sold for 
$1000 a unit consisting of one bond with a face value of $1000 and warrants to pur• 
chase five shares of what today would be called common stock. The warrants had an 
eight-year life, subsequently shortened to three years, and they were exercisable at $5 
per share. See Van Allen v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 7 Bosw. 515 (New York City Super. Ct. 
1861). The options on its assessable stock were nevertheless attractive to investors since 
the "Illinois Central ••• had practically promised in its financial prospectuses that few 
or no calls would be made on its stock. This promise had been of much importance in 
inducing British capitalists to purchase Illinois Central Bonds, with which there were 
stock subscription rights." P. GATES, THE ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD AND ITS COLONIZA-
TION WORK 78 (1934), dting the New York Tribune, June 26, 1852, April 5, 1853. 
54. See 2 w. Scorr, THE CoNSTlTUTlON AND FINANCE OF ENGIJSH, SCOTTISH AND IRISH 
JOINT-STOCK CoMPANIES TO 1720, at 97-98 (1910). 
A subsequent but better-known example of conversion is the request in 1631 by 
King Charles I of England that the Crown's interest in the New River Company, a 
London water company, be changed to an annuity; the royal request was honored al• 
though no option to convert had either been granted or reserved in the company's 
charter. 3 id. 19-24. Dewing cites this incident as an early example of conversion, A, 
DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 242 n.a (4th ed. 1941) and the incident has 
since been ensconced in the literature on convertible securities, The absence of a con-
tractually binding option privilege at the time the owner initially acquired his interest 
distinguishes these early incidents from present practice. 
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tions acquired a distinctly modern character. In 1709, the venerable 
Bank of England introduced what appears to be the first stock pur-
chase rights.65 Even the idea of using an equity inducement upon the 
marketing of a debt issue-the most frequent context in which war-
rants reach the public today-was successfully tried. In 1698, the 
Mine Adventurers' Company, owner of a Welsh silver and lead mine, 
sought to solve working-capital problems by recapitalizing itself. It 
authorized the issuance of 25,000 units consisting of one par value 
five-pound, six per cent income bond, plus one nondetachable lottery 
ticket;56 the prizes in the subsequently held lottery were shares of the 
company's stock. The units were issued to existing stockholders for 
their stock and were sold by the company to the public at five pounds 
per unit.67 
The common use of assessable stock in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries58 operated to postpone the warrant's appearance. 
Assessable stock took two forms. One permitted directors to call funds 
from shareholders at the time and in the amount specified in the sub-
scription. The second form required an order from a shareholders' 
assembly before funds could be called in.69 These financing prac-
tices made the corporation's access to the promised funds subject to 
the vagaries of the shareholders' subsequent inclination and ability 
to pay, but they gave shareholders an investment posture similar to 
the warrant. The payment of the first installment of the subscription 
price was comparable to purchasing the warrant. If months or years 
later a subsequent payment was called, the shareholder could pay 
if the investment's prospects were attractive. Otherwise the share-
55. The "Old Lady of Threadneedle Street" gave its shareholders the option to 
increase their holdings of its stock by 15 per cent upon the payent of £15 per share. As 
with rights today, these "liberties on the call of 15 per cent" expired in several weeks 
and were publicly traded at a price equivalent to the difference between the issue price 
of the new and the market price of the old stock. 3 W. SCO'IT, supra note 54, at 228 &: 
n.2, quoting The Post Boy, Dec. 19, 1709. 
56. The idea of a lottery with stock as prizes is somewhat astonishing since we have 
evolved beyond that particular capital-raising device. Such lotteries were, however, not 
uncommon events in early English finance. See 3 W. Scorr, supra note 54, at 427. 
57. The holders of the company's 4800 shares of stock could exchange each share 
(market value of £17 per share) for either four units or £20 cash. The premium over 
market was offered since the outstanding stock was to constitute the prizes in the lot-
tery, and the company had to ensure that it would, through either cash or the units, 
entice a large proportion of the existing stockholders to surrender their stock to the 
company. As it turned out 4008 shares were exchanged, leaving 8963 units available 
for sale to the public. Each of the 25,000 lottery tickets gave its holder the chance to 
win one of 2500 prizes, the prizes ranging from one to fifty shares of the company's 
stock. 2 W. Scorr, supra note 54, at 444-47. 
58. See A. DuBOIS, THE ENGLISH BUSINESS COMPANY .AFrER THE BUBBLE Acr: 1720-
1800, at 367 (1938); 2 W. Scorr, supra note 54, at 39-40, 217-18. 
59, A. DuBOIS, supra note 58. 
1422 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 70:1411 
holder would incur penalty for nonpayment, such as forfeiture00 
(which was comparable to expiration of the warrant) or loss of divi-
dends. 61 Suits to enforce payment, which, if successful, would have 
sharply reduced the investor's benefit, were quite infrequent.02 
The prospect of assessments in excess of a shareholder's initial pay-
ment reduced the attractiveness of long-term options (warrants) on 
such stock. Absent a specific provision absolving the warrant holder 
of assessments, the effective exercise price was subject to increase re-
sulting from any assessment between the date of grant and exercise. 
One may speculate that investors, then as now, would have been 
unwilling to pay much for a long-term option that in effect permitted 
the grantor to increase the exercise price in unspecified amounts; the 
investor's ability to judge future exercise values, and therefore his 
willingness to impart a leverage value upon the option, would have 
been limited. Perhaps, too, the corporate incentive to create war-
rants was obviated by a combination of the attractiveness to inves-
tors of the deferred-payment feature of assessable stock and the 
limited appeal of a long-term option on such stock. 
Warrants became an important financial instrument in the mid-
1920's.63 By then, American investor interest in fixed-income securi-
ties (bonds and preferred stock) had waned as a result of the ravages 
of inflation64 and the observation that bonds and preferred stock did 
not afford the expected protection in reorganizations. ou At the same 
time, common stocks were appreciating, thereby giving options on 
common obvious appeal. During that period of speculative excess 
immediately preceding the panic of 1929, more than twenty per cent 
60. ,a. at 368; 2 w. SCOT'f, supra note 54, at 14.15. 
6l. A, DuBOIS, supra n9te 51!, at 86$. 
62. Id. at 368-69. 2 W. SCO'IT, supra note 54, at 93-95. DuBois states that no common 
law right of action to enforce a call (assessment) was recognized and that a right to 
sue, if it existed at all, rested upon the privilege to incorporate granted by Parliamant. 
A. Du);JoIS, supra note !i8, at 369, One may speculate that the officers of many com-
panies ~o re;i$oned that the delay and adverse publicity of litigation would generate 
funds ;it to~ l;i~ ~ date and too high a cost to be helpful. 
68. fife Garner&: Forsythe, Stock Purchase Warrants and ''Rights", 4 S. CAL, L. R.Ev. 
~6~-70 (1981), It has been reportec;l that from 1900 through 1915 there was only one 
illstanc~ of a bond-warrant µnit financing (1906), and that from 1916 through 192!1 
there were only twenty,three such instances, with fourteen of these occurring in 1922, 
W. HICl\l\JAN, STATISTJCAL :(\:l"EASUJU:$ OF CORPORATE BOND FJNANCJNG SINCE 1900, at 210 
(196Q). 
64. Discussing the causes for the warrant's appearance in the mid-1920's, two plo• 
neer writers on the topic have stated that the purchasing power of a dollar invested 
in a bond in 1896 had declined to tlVenty-seven cents by the mid-1920's. Garner &: 
Forsythe, supra nqte 6~, at 269. 
65. Id. 
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of new bond and preferred financing included warrants,06 and 
some warrant issues, like other securities, acquired astonishing 
values.67 Three factors combined to ta,rnish severely the warrant's 
image: the erosion of warrant values during the 1930's and the even-
tual expiration 0£ the worthless option; the emerging perception that 
the potential dilution of shareholders' interests by warrants was :n.ot 
adequately appreciated;61l and the notoriety of several incidents jn 
which, for questionable reasons, a large n;qmber of warrants relative 
to common stock outstanding were issued. 69 These factors led inves-
tors to prefer less risky securities, and :financial m,magers to di~as-
sociate themselves from the pul;>li(;: issuance of instruments that were 
considered mischievous for both shareholders and warrant holders, 
It was not until the early 1960's, following a period of sustained ad-
vance in the stock market, that warrants began reappeari:pg with any 
frequency.70 By 1967, warrants had again become an important fi-
nancing device,71 That importance has subsequently increased.72 
66. A study by Mr. Clifford C. Keith of new issues of bonds and preferred stock by 
industrial and utility companies during the eight-month period between June 1, 1928, 
and January 31, 1929, disclosed that of 120 bond issues 26, or 21.7 per cent, contained 
stock purchase warrants (28 had conversion features), and of 113 issues of preferred 
stock 24, or 21.2 per cent, had stock purchase warrants attached (37 had conversion 
features). Keith, Convertible Securities and Stock Purchase Warrants, 2 RoCitY MT. L. 
R.Ev. 16, 17 n.2 (1929). Hickman reports that from 1924 through 1929 there were 340 
instances of bond-warrant unit financings totaling 1.2 billion dollars. W. HICKMAN, 
supra note 63, at 210-11. 
67. American &: Foreigu P9wer warrants appear ~o be the most extreme example 
of extravagant value. With 1.6 million shares of common stock outstanding, the com-
pany issued warrants to buy 7.~ million shares of common at $25 per share: When the 
priell of the common reached 1$8 in 1929, the warrants had a value of approxiµiately 
1.24 billion dollars versus approximately 320 million dollars for the common,. The 
earnings available to the common in 1929 were only 6.5 million dollars. See GRAH,-\M 
&: DODD, 2d ed., supra note 31, at 664,65. The company was recapitalized in 1952 and 
the warrants were eliminated as having no value, although the company reqiained 
solvent. See GRAHAM &: DoDD. 4th ed., supra note 35, at 657. 
68. See notes 98-100 infra and accompanying text. 
69, See, e.g., note 67 supra. 
70. GRAHAM &: DoDD, 4$ eel., supra note 35, at 657, Hic;kman reports only eig4t 
instances of bond-warrant unit financings in tjie ten-year period from 1934 thrpugh 
1943. W. HICKMAN, supra µote 6,3, at 210. 
71, In 1967 p11blic iSllues o! I:iond-wal-Tallt units nm:ql,}ered twenty-six with a \7!Uue 
of 304 million dollars, up from eigl!t with a value of 38 million cloll:Q'!i in 196l,. Jn the 
same year, pi:ivately placed J>ond-waqant units totaled forty,two witli a value of 278 
million dollars, up from thirty wjth a value of J64 million !lollars in 1965. The 1967 
total for all publicly and privately sold issues was sixty-eig4t, represenµ,ng a valµe of 
582 million dollars, Hay~ 8: Reiµng, ~pra noie 35, at W9. 
72. See Anreder, Not Just for Swingers, Barron's, Dec. 7, 1970, at 5, col. I; FORBES, 
JJ'~b. 15, 1969, at 26; :Bertoni Wall Street Crqze: Warrants To Buy Sfoclf, Stir Hot Con-
troverzy bµt Win Big Fqllowing, Wall St. J., May 5, 1969, at 1, ~ol, 6. 
The follQwing tal>le gives the yollll!le of ppnd-warrant units issued from January 
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C. The Warrant's Reappearance 
A number of factors coalesced to reintroduce the warrant to 
contemporary financing. Most of these considerations reflect the de-
mand for all forms of equity options, 73 not only units containing war-
rants. First and most basically, attitudes toward the economy and 
stock market have been optimistic for the long term, and therefore 
common stock and options on common stock have had appeal. A sec-
ond important factor has been tight monetary conditions. Given the 
scarcity of funds and the attendant high interest rates that have domi-
nated the money markets in the past few years, an option on equity 
has permitted companies to issue debt at a stated interest rate signifi-
cantly lower than the rate prevailing in straight debt offerings.74 
Moreover, as a practical matter, some companies are unable to issue 
debt in tight monetary periods, even at a high interest rate, without 
granting an option on equity.76 A third impetus for using equity 
options has been a change in attitude: corporate financial officers and 
their advisors have desired to utilize more debt in their capital 
1968 to August 1971, with statistics compiled under the author's direction from data 
reported by Investment Dealers' Digest: 
VOLUME OF BOND-WARRANT UNITS 
Public Issues Private Issues Total 
Amount Amount Amount 
(in millions (in millions (in millions 
Year No. of dollars) No. of dollars) No. of dollars) 
1968 17 243 62 375 79 618 
1969 14 290 87 705 IOI !1!15 
1970 9 1728 81 415 90 2148 
1971• 12 326 52 313 64 639 
• January through August. 
73. The term "equity option" is defined in note 49 supra. 
74. The low stated interest rate may be desirable for several reason&: to minimize 
contractual cash outflow commitments, to avoid any suggestion of a weakened credit po-
sition which the notoriety of an awkwardly high rate might suggest, or to comply with 
covenants in some loan agreements that specify the minimum amount by which annual 
cash inflow must exceed or "cover" annual interest payments. 
Note that part of the purchase price in a hybrid financing is being paid for the 
debt and part for the option feature. The market will demand the same yield from 
the hybrid debt as from straight debt. See note 125 infra and accompanying text. Con• 
sequently, it would be incorrect to conclude that the cost of debt capital has been 
lowered by a hybrid financing. 
75. Hayes, New Interest in Incentive Financing, HAnv. Bus. REV. July-Aug. 1966, 
at 99. 
It has been reported that just prior to the A.T. &: T. decision to issue a bond-warrant 
unit, the Mack Financial debentures of 1990 took dealers two weeks to sell despite a 
9¾% yield. Chrysler's 8¼% debentures of 1995 took nearly as long, and an A.T. &: T. 
affiliate, the Chesapeake &: Potomac Telephone Co. of Virginia, had sold only 40% of 
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structures to further enhance shareholder investments.76 The option 
on equity, or so-called "sweetener," permits this incremental debt 
to be effectively marketed as subordinated debt. 
Another factor that has accelerated the reappearance of options 
in general and warrants in particular is the unwillingness of investors 
in new or emerging companies to accept the risks of stock ownership. 
Debt's superior claim on liquidation is attractive to investors, but the 
going rate of interest may be an inadequate return for the attendant 
risk.77 The debt-option combination offers the flexibility of a claim 
on equity should the company prosper, plus some hedge against the 
company's failure. For dividend-paying companies there are also tax 
advantages to raising capital with convertible debentures or bond-
warrant units instead of convertible preferred or common stock. The 
new funds will be employed and be contributing to income by the 
time the option feature is exercised. In the interim, the cost of the 
money takes the form of interest-deductible for tax purposes78-
rather than a nondeductible dividend payment.79 
For some companies, until recently, accounting machinations 
were another impetus to the warrant's reappearance. Prior to the 
pronouncements in Accounting Principles Board80 Opinion Number 
its 8¾% debentures of 2010 when the offering syndicate broke up. See DUN's REVIEW, 
May 1970, at 29. 
76. Hayes &: Reiling, supra note 35, at 138-39. The liquidity crisis that hit several 
companies in 1970, most notably Penn-Central, may delay the trend toward greater 
use of debt. 
77. Theoretically the issuer could keep raising the interest rate on its debt to the 
point at which lenders would be enticed to assume the risks. Practically, there are severe 
constraints on this possibility. The issuer and, indeed, the lender will want to minimize 
interest charges to decrease the prospect of default on interest payments with the atten-
dant possibilities of reorganization in bankruptcy. Accommodating the issuer with an 
income bond, for example, might be unacceptable to the lender for a variety of reasons, 
including the reduced probability that interest would be received. In addition, such 
accommodation might jeopardize the characterization of the funds as debt for tax 
purposes. Cf. John Kelly Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946). 
78. See !NT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 163. 
79. Ignoring considerations other than tax, the individual investor would be indif-
ferent to whether he received dividends (except for the one-hundred-dollar dividend 
exclusion, !NT. REv. CODE of 1954, § II6) or interest. The corporate investor would 
prefer dividends because of the eighty-five per cent dividend deduction, INT. REv. 
CODE of 1954, § 243. 
80. The Accounting Principles Board (APB) of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA) has the authority to issue opinions on accounting prin-
ciples that, as a practical matter, constitute a governing standard of professional con-
duct. The force of these opinions is derived from the fact that the Council of the 
Institute on October 2, 1964, unanimously adopted a resolution that failure to disclose 
a material departure from an opinion would be substandard reporting. APB, AICP A, 
SPECIAL BULI.ErIN: DISCLOSURE OF DEPARTURES FROM OPINIONS OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 
BOARD (1964); APB, AlCPA, STATUS OF ACCOUNTING REsEARCH BULLETINS 1f 1 & app. A 
(1965) (APB Op. No. 6). 
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981 and Opinion Number 15,82 equity options were not reflected in 
the computation of earnings per share 011 common stock until the 
options were exercised.83 An acquisition utilizing preferred stock or 
debt with equity options enabled the acquiring company to increase 
its earnings available to common, the numerator in the computation, 
without increasing the denominator-a weighted average of the num• 
ber of common shares outstanding during the year.84 The aggrandized 
earnings-per-share figure often contributed quite substantially to an 
increase in the common's market value.86 Today, warrants remain 
more attractive than convertible securities or common stock in terms 
of computing earnings per share, but the accounting inducements 
for their use have been reduced: dilution from warrants now must 
be reflected, although only as the market price of the stock exceeds 
the exercise price of the warrant;86 in addition, APB Opinion 
Number 1487 requires that bond discount resulting from the issuance 
of bond-warrant units must be amortized as a deduction from in-
come, thereby reducing the corporation's reported profit. 
From the issuer's point of view, the particular force promoting 
the warrant was the perception that bond-warrant units are a natural 
extension of the now widely accepted convertible security,88 and the 
related belief that in certain circumstances bond-warrant units offer 
tax,89 cash fl.ow,90 and accounting91 advantages over convertibles.92 
81. APB, AICPA, REPORTING THE REsULTS OF OPERATIONS (1966) [hereinafter APB 
Op. No. 9] (effective for accounting periods beginning after Dec. 31, 1966). 
82. APB, AICPA, EARNINGS PER SHARE (1969) [hereinafter APB Op. No. 15] (efkctive 
for accounting periods beginning after Dec, 31, 1968). 
83. See Id. 1f 8. 
84. See AICPA, EARNINGS PER SHARE 1l1l 5, 7, 8 (1958) (Accounting Research Bulletin 
No. 49). 
85. Cf, Spacek, Umpiring the Earnings Per Share Results, NAA l\fANAt:EMENt Ac• 
COUNTING, March 1969, at 9. 
86, See text accompanying notes 140-41 infra. 
87. See APB, AICPA, AccelUNTING li'OR CONVERTIBLE DEBT ANO DEBT ISSUED WITH 
STOCK PURCHASE WARRANTS 1l1l 13-16 (1969) [hereinafter APB Op. No. 14]. 
88. Hayes&: Reiling, supra note 35, at 137. 
89. The allocation of cost between the elements of a bond-warrant unit may result 
in the presence of original-issue discount. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1232, The 
issuer may amortize this discount as an interest expense deduction ratably over the . 
life of the bond. Treas. Reg. § l.163-3(a) (1968). No allocation of value to the con• 
version feature of a convertible debenture is permitted. See Treas. Reg. § I.1232·3 
(b)(2)(i) (1968). The result of this contrast is, in effect, an interest expense deduction 
in the approximate value of the warrant, whereas the convertible debenture affords 
no comparable deduction. See note 263 infra. 
90. See note 132 infra. 
91. See text accompanying notes 140-41 infra. 
92. Lavely, Comparative Usage of Bond-Warrant and Convertible Bond Issues, 26 
J. FINANCE 796 (1971) (abstract of doctoral dissertation completed at the University of 
Iowa in 1970). 
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Furthermore, the warrant may make the debt instrument alluring to 
a class of investors not historically interested in the issuer's bonds.93 
Finally, in certain market conditions-particularly when the outlook 
is optimistic-the warrant may be more marketable because of its 
attractiveness to investors:94 the exercise price of the warrant can be 
more easily set at the market price of the common than can the con-
version price of a convertible95-a feature of at least superficial ap-
peal to investors; the separability of the elements of the bond-warrant 
unit gives its owner the attractive flexibility to keep one and to dis-
pose of the other element-a feature not available with converti-
bles;86 the usually noncallable character of a warrant allows the 
holder greater control over its exercise than is available through the 
typically callable convertible debenture; and the more aggressive in-
vestor has the opportunity for a postpurchase leverage advantage in 
bond-warrant units-in contrast to convertible securities and com-
mon stock.87 
II. SHAREHOLDERS' PERSPECTIVE 
A. Early Criticism of Warrants 
The issuance of warrants has long raised the important and 
troublesome question whether they serve the shareholders' interest. 
Graham and Dodd, the ranking authorities on security analysis, were 
disturbed by the warrant's propensity to sap the market value of com-
93. See DuN's REvmw, May 1970, at 29, 30 (quoting Allan G. Mitchell, Vice-President, 
Finance and Accounting, Philadelphia Electric Co.). Cf. Whittaker, The Evaluation of 
Warrants, INVESTMENT ANALYST (U.K.), Oct. 1967, at 46. 
94. A recent tax innovation requiring that cash basis investors annually report as 
ordinary income a pro rata share of original-issue discount may detract from the 
future marketability of bond-warrants units. See notes 209-18 infra and accompanying 
text. 
95. The interplay between the number of options offered, the market price of the 
common, and the principle amount of the senior security accompanying the option, 
favors the bond-warrant unit when the issuer is attempting to limit dilution and re-
spond to the market's desire for an option exercisable near the market price. Because 
the exercise of a convertible typically exhausts the face amount of the security, the 
smaller the number of options offered, the higher the conversion price. With warrants, 
the desired number of options can be made available without driving the exercise price 
away from the market price of the underlying common. 
96. See Hayes &:: Reiling, supra note 35, at 142-43. 
97. The Federal Reserve Board presently restricts loans by banks and brokerage 
houses for the purpose of purchasing or carrying convertible debentures, preferred 
stock, common stock, warrants, and bond-warrant units; there are no such restrictions 
on straight debt from which warrants have been detached. For restrictions on credit 
by brokers and dealers, see Regulation T issued by the Board of Governors, Federal 
Reserve System, 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-.123 (1972); 2 CCH Fm. BANKING L. REP. 1111 32,621-
775 (1972). For restrictions on credit by banks for the purpose of purchasing or carrying 
margin stocks, see Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. §§ 221.1-.120 (1972); 2 CCH FED. BANKING L. 
REP. 1111 32,811-890 (1972). 
1428 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 70:1411 
mon stock. In their words, "The option warrant is a fundamentally 
dangerous and objectionable device because it effects an indirect and 
usually unrecognized dilution of common stock value."08 Legal 
writers in the securities field in the 1920's and 1930's were especially 
concerned with protecting existing shareholders' rights in accumu-
lated surplus and corporate control; they also noted the absence of 
an intrinsic or exercise value for the warrants and the related prob-
lem of consideration.09 As two authorities observed: 
The very nature of the warrant is the idea of getting something for 
nothing. In the hands of non-shareholders, it is a means of "lying 
low" while others risk money in an enterprise, and then reaping 
some benefit.100 
More recently, even "practitioners of the warrant, conglomerate 
chieftans and cynical Wall Streeters have dubbed them 'funny money' 
and 'Castro pesos.' "101 
The foregoing does not suggest either legal liability for issuing 
warrants or liability for issuing them at improper prices; their is-
suance is statutorily authorized,102 and courts have understandably 
shied away from the difficult problem of valuing warrants.103 The 
commentators do, however, raise the more basic policy question 
whether issuance should be statutorily authorized at all, and, if so, 
whether restraints are necessary to forestall abuse and to align the 
warrant more closely to the shareholders' interest. 
At first glance much of the criticism appears to have merit. Con-
sider, for example, the LTV Aerospace bond-warrant unit financing 
of August 8, 1968. For $1,000 the purchaser acquired one twenty-
year 6 3/4 per cent debenture with a face amount of $1,000, plus 
thirty ten-year warrants exercisable at the common's then current 
market price of $28.50 per share.104 By definition, the warrant had 
no exercise value105 at issue. It is an understandable-though er-
roneous-initial impression that the $1,000 purchase price is the 
consideration for the bond while little or nothing has been paid for 
the seemingly worthless warrant. And yet, in exchange, the warrant 
holder has a "claim" on the values already paid in and created, and 
98. GRAHAM & DODD, 2d ed., supra note 31, at 645. 
99. See Berle, supra note 3, at 651, 658-61. See also Garner & Forsythe, supra note 
63, at 271-74, 277-78. 
100. Garner & Forsythe, Stock Purchase Warrants and "Rights", 4 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 
375, 384 (1931). 
IOI. See DUN'S R.Evmw, May 1970, at 29. 
102. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. 
103. See Wise v. Universal Corp., 93 F. Supp. 393 (D. Del. 1950). 
104. LTV Aerospace Corp., Prospectus, Aug. 8, 1968. 
105. The term "exercise value" is defined in note 40 supra. 
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on those to be created by the effects of business effort and chance. 
For ten years, a portion of the product of the common stockholders' 
assets are under the claim of the warrant holder. Management has 
seemingly granted a ten-year free ride. 
With the exception of an Erie-type reorganization,1°6 Graham and 
Dodd were quite uncompromising in their condemnation of war-
rants.107 On the other hand, Professor Berle concluded that the 
shareholders were adequately protected. Reasoning that the value of 
the stock depended upon an accumulation within the surplus ac-
count, he was satisfied that if the exercise price was fixed at an as-
certainably fair rate at the time the warrant was created, the stock-
holder had ample protection given the existence of the following 
three factors: (1) the corporation could distribute the surplus as 
dividends and thereby preclude the warrant holder from acquiring 
a right to it when he became a stock.holder; (2) the stockholders 
themselves must authorize the warrants and will therefore have as-
sented to the diminution of their rights; and (3) most importantly, 
the stockholders were protected by pre-emptive rights.108 
Social values and financial perceptions have advanced since these 
early writings on warrants and largely destroyed the premises on 
which they are based. Among other developments, the emergence 
of federal securities legislation,109 the enormous growth in the public's 
ownership of corporate equities,11° and the expansion of legal doc-
trines giving shareholders greater redress against corporate officers111 
serve to underline the shift in social attitude in the direction of 
providing greater protection to investors. A realistic perception of 
the significance of control also appears to have emerged. The propen-
sity of most shareholders of publicly owned corporations to approve 
management initiatives112 places effective control in management, 
and suggests that the control implications of issuing warrants would 
106. The optioned stock was that received in the reorganization by former bond-
holders. See In re Erie R.R., 37 F. Supp. 237, 247-48 (N.D. Ohio 1940). 
107. See text accompanying note 98 supra. 
108. Berle, supra note 3, at 658-61. ;But see id. at 665-66 (regarding shareholder au-
thorization of warrants). 
109. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1970); Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970). 
110. In 1970 ownership of listed, unlisted, and investment company shares involved 
approximately 31 million individuals, or 15.1 per cent of the population. As recently as 
1952 there were only 6.5 million shareholders, constituting 4.2 per cent of the popula-
tion. Share Ownership Goes to New, Big Heights, THE EXCHANGE, July 1970, at 15, 16-17 
(published by the N.Y. Stock Exchange). 
111. See, e.g., Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARv. L. 
REv. 1146 (1965); Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development of 
Federal Corporation Law Under Rule lOb-5, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 1361 (1965). 
112. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 83 
(rev. ed. 1968). 
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be of very limited concern to that great majority of shareholders 
who did not possess or aspire to a major block of the corporation's 
stock. In addition, the determination of whether the warrant's terms 
are fair is now perceived to involve more than an assessment of the 
exercise price. The life of the warrant is comparable in importance 
to exercise price.118 Furthermore, the thesis that stockholders must 
authorize warrants is also suspect. Today, warrants are statutorily 
authorized, and shareholders need not approve their issuance unless 
a charter provision so provides or the optioned stock is governed by 
pre-emptive rights.114 The historic balance sheet analysis, which fo. 
cuses on the significance of surplus to stock values, overlooks the 
significance of dividend policy115 and financial leverage in the capital 
structure.116 While modern writers disagree about what investors 
really capitalize as part of the stock-valuation process,117 there has 
been a definite shift from the balance sheet approach to an assess-
ment of future earnings and dividends. One can generalize that the 
value of corporate stock is presently perceived to be the present value 
of all future dividends and future reinvested earnings available to 
that stock.118 Thus, a comparison of the surplus accounts and market 
values of IBM, Xerox, U.S. Steel, and Chrysler will show the specious-
ness of the premise that the value of a stock depends on the surplus 
account. Moreover, the distribution of surplus solely to thwart the 
warrant holder would have adverse effects on working capital and 
corporate momentum that would likely make the cure more painful 
than the malady.119 Finally, the argument that shareholders are pro-
tected by pre-emptive rights loses force when it is noted that a de-
113.- See notes 127-32 infra and accompanying text. 
114. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1104 (West 1955); DEL, CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 
(1953); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.16 (Page 1964). 
115. See Miller &: Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the 'Valuation of Shares, 
34 U. Cm. J. Bus. 411 (1961); Friend &: Puckett, Dividends and Stock Prices, 54 AM. 
ECON, REv. 656 (1964). 
116. See Durand, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of 
Investment: Comment, 49 AM. EcoN. REv. 639 (1959); Solomon, Leverage and the Cost 
of Capital, 18 J. FINANCE 273 (1963), But see Modigliani &: Miller, The Cost of Capital, 
Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. EcoN, R.Ev. 261 (1958), 
117. Mao i<;lentifi~ four different theories of stock valuation which, are based on 
different assumptions but which are mathematically equivalent under conditions of 
certainty, rationality, !!lld a perfect capital n;iarkc:;t. Each focuses on future events and 
specifically 'Qpon either future earnings, the projec~ generating those earnings, or uses 
of those earnin&5, J. MAo, QUAriTI'l'Al"l\lE ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL DECISION:;; 464-50/l 
(l969). 
118. See Miller &: Modigliani, supra note 115; Wendt, Current Growth Stock Yallla• 
tjon Methods, FINANCIAL ANALYsrs J., March-AprU ~965, at 91. See also E. SoLOMOt-1, THE 
THEORY OF FINANqAL MANA(:EMENT 21-23 (1963). 
119. It also ~eems ~asonable to Sfecµlate that eliminating surplus by capltalizing 
it through an increased par value or stock dividends would have no adverse effect on 
the valuation accorded the optioned common. (The ordinary dilution provisions pro• 
tect the warrant holder against stock dividends.) 
August 1972] Stock Purchase Warrants 1431 
creasing number of shareholders in publicly owned corporations 
possess pre-emptive rights,120 and that shareholders have a pronounced 
tendency to rubber-stamp management proposals,121 such as the elim-
ination of pre-emptive rights.122 In light of these developments, it 
seems clear that although the issuance of warrants is authorized by 
state law, a new conceptual framework is needed to justify that au-
thorization. 
B. Conceptual Framework for Issuing Warrants 
in Bond-Warrant Units 
The issuance of bond-warrant units presupposes a particular set 
of circumstances: a company wants or needs funds and is unable or 
unwilling for good business reasons either to borrow from its banks 
or to issue senior debt.123 Consequently, it contemplates the issuance 
of either subordinated debt, equity, or a hybrid security. Within 
this context, a proper analysis of warrants in bond-warrant units re-
quires that cognizance be taken of two critical premises. First, a unit 
has been sold, and therefore an assessment of the warrant requires 
consideration of its effect upon its companion component. Second; 
the desirability of issuing a bond-warrant unit is a relative question: 
is the bond-warrant unit more attractive, particularly in terms of cash 
flow, accounting, and risk characteristics, than the alternatives of 
issuing straight subordinated debt, common stock, or another hybrid 
security such as a convertible debenture? The early writings on war-
rants evidence limited sensitivity to these premises and their im-
plications. 
The early concern that a warrant holder received something for 
nothing, or, conversely, that the issuer has given up something of 
120. "The battle for the owner's right to subscribe to new issues of common stock, 
or issues convertible into common, continued unabated in 1969 • • • • Proxy statement 
after proxy statement appeared asking for the elimination of pre-emptive rights, ••• " 
L. &: J. GILBERT, THmTIETH ANNUAL REPORT OF STOCKHOLDER AcnvrrIES AT CORPORATION 
MEETINGS DURING 1969, at 208 (1970). The authors identify twenty-five major companies 
that completely eliminated pre-emptive rights in 1969 and only one whose attempt 
to eliminate failed. Id. at 208-15. In addition, two major companies are reported to 
have shifted from pre-emptive rights to limited pre-emptive rights, i.e., pre-emptive 
rights which "exclude from their purview international financing ••• stock issued in 
connection with acquisitions, and optiorts •••. " Id. at 208, 215-16. All twenty-three 
proxy statement attempts to irttroduce limited pre-emptive rights in place of no pre-
emptive rights were defeated. Id. at 216. 
121. A. BERLE &: G. MEANs, supra note 112. 
122. The grant of warrants by some issuers to underwriters of an initial public 
offering also minimizes the control shareholders have over the grant of warrants: the 
public shareholders may be faced with a fait accompli. However, here the potential 
public shareholder's freedom not to buy is an effective defender of his personal in-
terests. 
123. For possible reasons for this situation, see notes 75-76 supra and accompanying 
text. 
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value and received nothing in return, was unjustified. Illustratively, 
it is reasonable to suppose that had LTV Aerospace issued straight 
debt instead of bond-warrant units on August 8, 1968,124 the straight 
debt would have sold at face value and commanded a stated interest 
rate of approximately 8 1/2 per cent125 instead of the 6 3/4 per cent 
actually paid. Assuming each $1,000 debenture remained outstand-
ing for its twenty-year life, 126 this would mean that the issuance of 
the warrants created savings of $350 per bond and an after-tax 
saving of $175 (assuming a 50 per cent ta.'{ rate), or $5.83 per war-
rant. Using present-value techniques,127 each warrant represents a 
corporate benefit of approximately $2.18.128 Of particular significance 
is the fact that this benefit will be received regardless of whether 
the warrant is eventually exercised, and the additional fact that a]• 
though there is no reduction in the effective interest rate on the debt 
portion of the unit, there is an annual reduction in debt burden, 
which reduces the risk of bankruptcy. In addition, if the company 
prospers and the common's market price rises above the warrant's 
exercise price by the termination date, the issuer will obtain an addi-
tional cash inflow from the exercise of the warrant. A reasonable 
present value for the exercise price is $9.18,128 making the total of 
reduced cash outflow on the amount of the debt and increased cash 
inflow, assuming exercise, equal to approximately $11.36. 
An alternative and preferable method for assessing the interaction 
124. The LTV Aerospace financing of August 8, 1968 is described in the text accom• 
panying note 104 supra. 
125. From September 27, 1968, through October 29, 1968, the bonds traded sepa• 
rately in a range from 77 to 79¾, Using a value of 79, or 790 dollars, as the market's 
perception of the bonds' value, it was the market's judgment that the subordinated 
debt of this company should pay interest at 67J'J0/790 or 8J'J4 per cent. With the valua-
tion period beginning seven weeks after issue, the market should have acquired a 
"feel" for the bond. See note 50 supra. 
126. The bond might be called, but that presupposes either a meaningful increase 
in the issuer's credit worthiness or a drop in interest rates generally. 
127. For a general discussion of the concept and technique of "present value" sec, 
e.g., J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 53•55, 57-59 (1968), 
128. Because the total saving will occur ratably over a twenty-year period of time, 
while we wish to assess the benefit as of the date of issue, the sum must be discounted 
to reflect the forgone return in the early years of the saving deferred until later years, 
Two alternative discount rates may be applied to this type of investment. Utilizing the 
company's return on total capital, and assuming the 12% rate experienced in 1968 is 
a representative opportunity rate, the present value of $5.83 is $2.18. A second method 
is based on the company's cost of long-term debt. Using the 85% cost on the debt in 
the bond-warrant unit, this approach indicates a present value of approximately $3.00 
per warrant. 
129. The exercise price of the warrants was $2850. Since the warrants had a ten• 
year life, and since warrants remain unexercised until just before expiration, see note 
28 supra, the present value of this sum is $9.18, using a 12% discount rate representing 
the assumed opportunity rate of the average return on total capital. Using a cost of 
long-term debt assumed to be 85%, the present value of the exercise price would be 
several dollars higher. 
August 1972] Stock Purchase Warrants 1433 
of the warrant and its companion component is to recognize in our 
example that $790, its fair market value, has been paid for the bond; 
the bond has therefore been issued at a discount. The $210 difference 
between the $1,000 cost of the unit and the $790 paid for the bond 
has been paid for the warrants. Thus, conceptually and practically, 
capital has been raised for the corporation by the sale of a distinct 
security, the warrant; the bond and warrant have been sold together 
merely to maximize the financing utility. Thus viewed, seven dol-
lars, substantially more than the present value of the interest saved, 
was received for each of the thirty warrants. Since the financial con-
sequences of exercise remain the same, the combined effect of the 
warrant's sale and exercise has a present value of approximately six-
teen dollars.180 
From the shareholder's legal perspective, his corporation has re-
ceived consideration for the warrant in the form of lower interest 
payments on the debt element of the unit, or, alternatively and 
more correctly, in the form of an allocated portion of the total cost 
of the unit. From the shareholder's financial perspective, the gross 
benefit immediately derived from issuance of the warrant includes 
a reduced risk of default on interest payments plus a monetary effect 
which, at a minimum, equals the present worth of the after-tax cash 
interest payments saved over the period the bond is outstanding. 
Indeed, the gross monetary effect will often exceed the present value 
after tax of the interest saved. This effect is maximized when the 
warrant's leverage value permits it to be sold to investors-who 
are interested in leverage value, not the interest saved by the corpo-
ration-for more than the present worth of the interest saved. 
While the foregoing considers the interaction of the elements of 
the bond-warrant unit, the attractiveness of that unit when compared 
to financing alternatives must also be considered. There is as yet a 
limited quantum of financial literature directed to this analysis.181 
Nevertheless, reflection suggests that the issuance of subordinated 
straight debt will be the most desirable alternative in terms of long-
run cash flow effects, providing the risks attending high fixed costs 
are tolerable and the prospects of corporate prosperity are good. 
mo. The $16 is composed of the $7 received immediately plus the $9 representing 
the present value of the exercise price. 
Several factors interact to contribute to the difference between the $2.18 present 
value, after tax, of the cash interest payments saved and the $7 for which the warrant 
was sold. The former is influenced by the corporate tax rate and the discount rate, 
whereas the latter is not. The latter figure further reflects leverage value, while the 
former does not. 
131. Two articles available in the public literature are Schwartz, Warrants: A. Form 
of Equity Capital, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J., Sept.-Oct. 1970, at 87; Hayes &: Reiling, 
supra note 35. 
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While the various equity alternatives commit the issuer to the sale 
of varying amounts of equity at a price somewhere between the mar-
ket price at issuance and a premium of ten to fifteen per cent over 
market, the use of debt enables the company to reserve the sale of 
common for the future, when it is hoped that higher prices will pre-
vail.132 Under varying combinations of assumptions regarding such 
132. To illustrate the interaction of some of the factors relevant to an analysis of 
the cash flows from the several basic financing plans, assume that the following alter• 
natives were available: 
I. Fifty shares of common sold at $20 per share. 
2, $1000 face amount of subordinated straight debt: twenty years to maturity, 
8½% interest. 
3. $1000 face amount of subordinated convertible debentures: twenty years to ma• 
turity, 6¾% interest, convertible at $22 per share (10% over market) into 45,4 
shares of common. (A convertible preferred financmg, from the issuer's view• 
point, is merely a variant of convertible debenture financing.) 
4. A bond-warrant unit consisting of (a) $1000 face amount of subordinated 
straight debt: twenty years to maturity, 6¾% interest; and (b) twenty-seven 
warrants: exercisable at $20 per share, expirmg at the end of ten years. The 
debenture alone would sell for approximately $790 to give an 8½% yield. 
Generating $210 of value through warrants exercisable at the market price of 
$20 would require twenty-seven warrants, using the rule of thumb that warrants 
will be valued at 40% to 50% of the exercise price when the exercise price 
and market price are the same and the warrant has a long life, See text accom• 
panying note 44 supra. 
Now assume that management and its advisors consider it highly probable that the 
company will prosper and the market will recognize this prosperity to the extent that 
the issuer's common stock will double in price from $20 to $40 per share in ten years 
and will double again from $40 to $80 per share bet:lveen year 10 and year 20. The 
following table illustrates the amounts and timing of receipt of the capital made avail• 
able to the company. (In order to maximize comparability the eventual issuance of 
fifty shares of common is assumed.) 
CAPITAL ACCRUING TO ISSUING CORPORATION 
UNDER FOUR ALTERNATIVE FINANCING PLANS 
Common stock 


















• The $4000 is raised in year 20 through the sale of fifty shares of common at $80 
per share; $1000 of debt is retired. 
t The $1000 debenture is converted and 4.6 shares of common are sold at $80 per 
share. 
:j: Exercise of twenty-seven warrants at $20 at the end of year 10 generates $540. 
The $1840 is raised in year 20 through the sale of twenty-three shares of common at $80 
per share; $1000 of debt is retired. 
Necessary refinements in the foregoing patterns of cash flow would include the 
following: reduction of the common stock alternative by the dividends, if any, on fifty 
shares of stock for twenty years; reduction of the straight subordinated debt altern.itive 
August 1972) Stock Purchase Warrants 1435 
factors as short-term and long-term earnings, volatility of earnings, 
interest costs, and differences between the number of shares imme-
diately issued and optioned, any one of the equity options-common 
stock, bond-warrant units, and convertible debentures-can be the 
more attractive. Certainly, in that narrow area in which the risk of 
issuing hybrids is tolerable but the risk of issuing straight debt is not, 
there are situations where, because of the premium paid for the op-
tion, more dollars can be raised per share of common issued through 
options than can be raised directly through the sale of common. 
The very legitimate concern about the unrecognized nature of 
dilution138 remains a significant problem today. Management must 
be sensitive to dilution when selecting financing alternatives and 
pricing bond-warrant units; a segment of the investing public (which 
is large enough to influence market prices) has a myopic view of 
security valuation that focuses very heavily on short-term trends in 
reported earnings per share.184 Recent APB opinions have addressed 
the problem of the earnings-per-share calculation. APB Opinion 
Number 9 required corporations to reflect the dilutive effect of 
warrants and other claims against equity in a new, supplemental 
"Fully Diluted Earnings Per Share Figure";135 APB Opinion Num-
ber 15, which superseded Opinion Number 9, extended this treat-
ment of warrants to "Primary Earnings Per Share" by including 
"common stock equivalents" in the denominator of the computation 
and by requiring that warrants be identified as common stock equiva-
lents at all times.136 Earnings-per-share data are now computed by a 
"treasury stock" method: the warrants are treated as if they were 
exercised at the beginning of the accounting period ( or at the time 
of issuance, if later) and as if the funds obtained were used to 
by tbe after-tax interest cost on 8½% for twenty years; reduction of the convertible 
debenture and bond-warrant unit alternative by tbe after-tax interest cost on 6¾ % 
for twenty years; adjustment of tbe convertible debenture alternative to reflect the 
possibility tbat tbe securities may be converted earlier tban year 20 if tbe investor's 
after-tax dividend income from the common exceeds tbe after-tax interest income from 
tbe debt, or tbat tbe issuer calls tbe debenture; adjustment of tbe bond-warrant unit 
alternative to reflect dividend payments on twenty-seven shares for ten years; tbe ad-
justment of each alternative by tbe application of present-value techniques. 
One further refinement would be to emphasize tbat one does not know witb cer-
tainty tbe price of tbe stock at years 10 and 20. In fact, a range of values is possible 
at any given date, with varying probabilities tbat any one value will occur. The dy-
namics of tbis and otber uncertainties would change tbe relative attractiveness of the 
financing alternatives. 
133. See text accompanying note 98 supra. 
W4-. See Delancey, A.P ,B. Opinion No. 15 (Earnings Per Share) from a Lawyer's 
Standpoint, 25 ;Bus. LAw. 419, 423 (l!,170). 
135. APB Op, No. 9, supra noie 81, 11 43. 
136. See APB Op. No. 15, supra note 80, 1111 35-36. 
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purchase common stock at the average market price during the 
period.137 The dynamics of these provisions are such that when 
the market price remains close to the exercise price, little or no di-
lution is manifest (no purchase is assumed if its effect would be 
antidilutive). However, as the market price moves above the exer-
cise price, the potential dilution will be reflected in the earnings-
per-share computation. 
Supplementing APB Opinion Number 15-and partially com-
pensating for that opinion's limited depiction of warrant dilution-
is APB Opinion Number 14, which requires that the price of a 
bond-warrant unit be allocated between its elements; when this 
results in the bond being issued at a discount, the discount must be 
amortized over the life of the bond as an interest expense deduc-
tion.138 Thus, as provided in APB Opinion Number 14, the issuance 
of warrants in bond-warrant units affects earnings, and then the re-
duced earnings are used to compute earnings per share under the 
procedures set forth in APB Opinion Number 15. These innovations, 
combined with the percolation effect of information from the security 
analyst to less sophisticated investors, seem calculated to increase 
markedly the awareness of potential dilution. Nevertheless, the recog-
nition of potential dilution remains an important topic since the 
issuance of warrants has no effect on the denominator in the earn-
ings-per-share computation unless and until the stock's market price 
has moved above the exercise price, and even then the effect will 
depend upon how far above the exercise price the market price has 
moved.139 Only thoughtful consideration of the issuer's balance sheet 
and its accompanying footnotes will give a clear picture of the poten-
tial dilution from warrants. 
An additional and ongoing problem is the need to recognize that 
accounting principles depict differently the dilution of the several 
financing alternatives. Whereas the amount of dilution from war-
rants and the time at which it is shown varies with the common's 
market price, the sale of common stock immediately increases the 
denominator in the earnings-per-share computation by the number 
137. Id. The treasury-stock method of reflecting use of proceeds is modified if the 
number of shares obtainable upon exercise of options exceeds twenty per cent of the 
number of common shares outstanding at the end of the computation period. Id. ~ 88. 
138. APB Op. No. 14, supra note 87, ~ 16. 
139. Using the facts of the example in note 132 supra, as the common appreciates 
from $20 to $40 to $80, the dilution from the sale of common will be fifty shares in 
each instance; whereas the warrant with an exercise price of $20 will show no dilution 
at $20 per share, 13.5 shares of dilution at $40 per share [27 shares minus (27 X 20)/40), 
and 20.3 shares at $80 [27 shares minus (27 X 20)/80). See APB Op. No. 15, supra note 
82, ~~ 35-36. 
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of shares issued.140 As with the issuance of common stock, the dilution 
associated with convertible debentures is also depicted immediately. 
They are treated as converted in the fully diluted earnings-per-share 
figure, which arguably is the financial statistic most significant for 
security analysts; conversion is assumed for purposes of the primary 
earnings-per-share figure if, at the time of issuance, the convertible 
debenture has a cash yield, based on its market price, of less than two 
thirds of the then current bank prime interest rate.141 
While concern with the manner by which dilution is disclosed re-
mains a problem, albeit much reduced from earlier periods, this 
should not blur the realization that the various financing alternatives 
usually commit a company to meaningfully different degrees of 
dilution. For example, raising capital through the sale of common 
stock requires the issuance of more stock over the life of the financing 
than is required to raise the same amount of capital by issuing straight 
debt142 or by issuing debt with an equity sweetener. 
In terms of risk to the issuer, the bond-warrant unit and the con-
vertible debenture represent an intermediate position between 
straight debt on the one hand, and convertible preferreds, straight 
preferreds, or common stock on the other; the bond in a bond-warrant 
unit generally has a lower annual fixed charge than a straight-debt 
offering and consequently slightly hedges the risk of default. On the 
other hand, the bond-warrant unit represents a significantly greater 
risk than an immediate sale of preferred stock, which generally has a 
commitment to future redemption but no unequivocal commitment 
to annual dividends, or than an immediate sale of common stock, 
which has no unequivocal commitment to either annual payments or 
redemption. 
Another aspect of risk relevant to the issuer and its stockholders 
is the potential injury to the issuer's reputation through use of 
warrants. Investor suspicion of companies issuing warrants was a 
reasonable response to the boom-and-bust trading experience that 
warrants previously experienced, and to the fact that certain firms 
issued a large number relative to their common stock outstanding143 
with the result that a large portion of the issue's market value was 
perceived to reside in the more risky warrants.144 Major variables 
affecting this trading phenomenon included such economic and fina11 • 
140. APB Op. No. 15, supra note 82, 1111 14-15. 
141. Id. 1111 33, 41. 
142. See note 132 supra. 
143. See, e.g., note 67 supra. 
144-. See text accompanying notes 63-70 supra. 
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cial factors as the estimated prospects for the economy, the industry, 
and the company, plus such provisions of the warrants as their exer• 
cise price and duration.145 A shareholder's best interest would seem to 
be served if his company has a reputation for being financially sound 
and responsible. To the extent that this is true, and to the extent 
that warrants Continue to be perceived as speculative securities, share• 
holders' interests will be advanced when managen1ent limits warrants 
to a modest petcentage of the outstanding common stock.140 Manage• 
ment should also exercise its control over contract terms to stipulate 
a moderate life--'-approxirnately five years-for its warrants so that 
their volatility can be kept within acceptable limitsi if management 
forecasts of earnings and market values are ultimately shown to be 
conservative, the unexpectedly high warrant values will be kept Un• 
der control by the nearing expiration date. A five-year life would 
also increase the financial benefits indirectly received by existing 
shareholders.147 Moreover, a five-year life should not detract from the 
instrument's leverage value since the best available evidence indi-
cates the warrant retains a substantial and predictable leverage or 
premium value as long as there are more than two years to expira• 
tion;148 a three-year margin of error should optimize the chances for 
this leverage to be imparted. Indeed, from the existing shareholder's 
perspective, long-lived warrants are decidedly undesirable. The 
longer the life, the greater the possibility for volatile price move• 
ments and the lower the present value of the exercise price. Thus, 
in ordinary circumstances149 the issuance of perpetual warrants, fiftyw 
145. Comparable reasons underlie the New York Stock Exchange's decislott in the 
1930's rtot to list warrants. Three reasons have been given: warrants have no intrinsic 
value; they were volatile in price; they became nearly worthless when the price of the 
common fell far enough below the exercise price. THE ExCHANGE, March 1970, at 18 
(published by the N.Y. Stock Exchange). The last reason lnehtioncd 1vot1ld reflect 
economic assessments covering the economy, industry, and company. Volatility would be 
the consequence of an interaction between economic factors, exercise price, and life. 
The first argument seems more a reason why the warrants could become worUtlcss 
than a separate argument. 
146. ·with regard to the appropriate maximum percentage of warrants outstanding, 
personal judgment presently has considerable room in which to function. Use <>£ and 
attitudes toward warrants are evolving, and it is extremely difficult to isolate empirically 
investors' reactions to the percentage of common stock represented by warrants from 
other significant factors affecting attitudes. In the A.T. &: T. and Chrysler offerings, notes 
1 &: 4-5 supra and accompanying text, warrants represented approximately 5.6 and 3.6 
per cent respectively of the outstanding common. 
147. The examples in the text accompanying notes 129-30 and in note 132 supra 
assumed a ten-year life. A five-year life would increase the present value of the future 
savings derived by the issuer from the warrant. 
148. The reduction in leverage value or premium has been found to begin in thr 
third year from expiration with most of the reduction occurring in the last two years 
of the warrant's life. Shelton, supra note 28, pt. 2, at 93. 
149. This analysis presumes the continued validity of the two-year rule, ttoto 148 
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year warrants, or even twenty-year warrants would be highly ques-
tionable. 
A final aspect of the conceptual framework for using warrants is 
the instrument's emergence as an independent security and the im-
plications of this development. There has been a shift away from 
viewing the warrant only as a mechanism for selling common stock 
and toward recognizing it as a distinct, though hybrid, security. Cer-
tainly, it is the reality of bond-warrant unit financing that corpora-
tions are raising capital by selling warrants to the public. Moreover, 
the capital raised upon both issuance and the possible subsequent 
exercise is permanent; there is no commitment as in a convertible 
debenture to repay funds at a future date. A quarter of a century 
ago in a reorganization context, the SEC anticipated the tone of 
present developments by wisely going beyond traditional common-
stock and preferred-stock designations to refer to warrants as "in 
effect a junior equity security."15° Current accounting practice lends 
credence to this junior equity status. Warrants are deemed "common 
stock equivalents"151 for purposes of computing earnings per share, 
and, whereas they previously received mention only in footnotes to 
the balance sheet, they are now treated as part of the capitalization of 
the company, although they are not as yet segregated in financial 
statements.152 Finally, the courts are recognizing the warrant as a 
junior equity. Judge Tyler of the Southern District of New York, 
the nation's major finance law jurisdiction, recently held in Entel v. 
Guilden153 that section 17(e) of the Investment Company Act of 
1940154 creates a private right of action that may be brought by 
holders of an investment company's warrants for the benefit of the 
company. He discussed the warrant as follows: 
[W]arrants are used ... as a separate form of equity in corporations. 
Presumably, this usage stems from a desire of the investment com-
munity for what here has been called "distilled stock", offering 
supra and accompanying text, and the related willingness of the market to impart a 
meaningful leverage value which the issuer can anticipate in his pricing decision. 
150. In re Childs Co., 24 S.E.C. 85, 121 n.9 (1946). The question was whether the 
prohibition against issuance of nonvoting stock by a corporation in a bankruptcy re-
organization under what is now 11 U.S.C. § 616(12)(2) (1970) foreclosed the issuance of 
warrants. 
151. See text accompanying note 136 supra. 
152. Proceeds from sale of the warrant are added to paid-in capital. APB Op. No. 
14, supra note 87, 1J 16. 
153. 223 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
154. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e) (1970). 
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more risk and more potential gain per dollar than common stock. 
The creation of varied modes of investment-different sized bundles 
of rights-which are calculated to encourage the total flow of capital 
into corporate aggregations should be facilitated in a society which 
depends largely upon the gathering of private capital to achieve 
economic expansion .... The facts that warrants traditionally, albeit 
somewhat loosely, have been deemed more akin to options than to 
shares of stock ... should not bar this court from assessing the fea-
tures of these warrants which render them essentially equity secur-
ities ... ,155 
Entel was subsequently interpreted to have held that the warrant 
represented an "ownership interest" in the company, based on the 
fact that a warrant holder contributes capital and assumes the finan-
cial risk of warrant values, which fluctuate with the common stock's 
value.156 
This evolution toward a perception of the warrant as a distinct 
equity security is reasonable, desirable, and likely to continue. This 
new perception has ramifications particularly for the holder, but also 
for the issuer and its shareholders. While shareholders possess the 
right to authorize the issuance of the classic equity securities, they 
typically have no similar right under state corporate law to authorize 
warrants.157 It seems proper that shareholders should possess this 
right, especially since the issuance of perpetual and very long-term 
warrants appears to be undesirable; the warrant, although somewhat 
tamed, remains a remarkably flexible instrument, possessed-as has 
been demonstrated earlier in this century-with unique possibilities 
for misuse. In addition, to avoid the compulsion for open market 
purchases of common stock and to protect stockholders from the ar-
gument that authorization of warrants implicitly authorizes the 
issuance of the underlying common stock, warrants should not be 
issuable unless authorized (but unissued) common or treasury stock 
is reserved at issuance for the warrants' subsequent exercise. 
III. HOLDER'S PERSPECTIVE 
From the holder's perspective, characteristics of warrants can be 
conveniently discussed under three headings: finance, corporate law, 
and taxation. 
155. 223 F. Supp. at 132. 
156. Verrey v. Ellsworth, 303 F. Supp. 497, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
157. A few states require that shareholders approve the issuance of warrants when 
at the time of grant there is inadequate authorized but unissued stock available to 
satisfy the warrants should they be exercised. See, e.g., Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.16 
(2) (Page 1964). 
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A. Financial Characteristics 
Although the :financial characteristics of warrants have already 
been considered generally, three features are particularly relevant to 
holders and can usefully be emphasized. The most prominent reason 
for investors to select bond-warrants is to "have their cake and eat it 
too." The bond gives both a high probability of cash income and 
some protection against loss of principal, while the warrant gives 
a claim on equity that is valuable if the company prospers. The inves-
tor, by purchasing two very separate and distinct securities, is thus 
hedging against the occurrence of opposite significant events-disas-
ter or considerable success-while sacrificing if the performance is 
in the middle range. The second and third notable financial features 
focus on the relationship between the warrants and the company's 
success as reflected in its common stock. The common stock under-
lying the warrant must have appreciation possibilities, and the war-
rant must have a life of sufficient duration to permit stock apprecia-
tion to surpass the warrant's cost and to return a profit. If the 
normal characteristics are present,158 the common will have to 
appreciate forty to fifty per cent before a purchaser, or succession of 
purchasers viewed as a single entity, 159 can break even on the invest-
ment. According to the best available research, warrant holders ap-
pear to view nvo years as the requisite period in which this apprecia-
tion must be accomplished. The leverage value begins to fade rapidly 
when the remaining warrant life reaches two years,160 and conse-
quently from this point to expiration the appreciation needed to 
cover the leverage portion of the warrant's cost is steadily reduced. 
If the warrant's life is too short, if appreciation possibilities for the 
common are modest, or if special features such as a redemption or 
call provision detract from the warrant's appeal, there should then 
be a reduction in the leverage value that the issuer must anticipate 
in its pricing decision and that the holder must perceive the warrant 
to merit. 
B. Corporate Law Characteristics 
From the late 1920's to the late 1960's, there was limited public 
issuance and exercise161 of warrants, and state legislatures gave little 
158. See notes 15-18 supra and accompanying text. 
159. The warrant's leverage value permits individual purchasers to sell at a profit 
before the intrinsic value is enough to cover his cost. However, each successive purchaser 
must perceive the appreciation possibility or he should be unwilling to make the pur-
chase, thereby depriving the earlier purchaser of the market willing to impart a leverage 
value. 
160. See note 148 supra. 
161. See notes 67-69 supra and accompanying text. There appears to have been a 
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statutory attention to the instrument. In addition, there is a dearth 
of recent state law cases, and the few that have been decided add little 
to the law's earlier profile. The basic posture of state corporate law 
governing warrants, therefore, remains unchanged since the early 
1930's.162 Understandably, none of the rights of common stock 
owners accrue to the warrant holder by virtue of his warrant owner-
ship.163 Thus, at present, the warrant's legal rights still depend solely 
on its contract.164 
The instrument's rapid appearance and disappearance early in 
the century probably explain much of the statutory neglect. The 
early concept of a warrant holder as something of a corporate parasite 
has probably delayed the development of legal principles increasing 
his protection. However, one recent case suggests greater sensitivity 
to the warrant holder's vulnerable position. In Stephenson v. Plastics 
Corp. of America,165 a corporation issued warrants and subsequently 
adopted and implemented a plan whereby it transferred a portion 
of its assets to a new subsidiary in exchange for the subsidiary's 
stock; the parent then distributed the subsidiary's stock to the 
parent's shareholders and to those warrant holders exercising before 
a specified date. In a suit by warrant holders who exercised their 
warrants before expiration but nine months after the specified date, 
the Minnesota supreme court reversed the lower court's dismissal 
of the suit on the pleadings. In remanding the case, the court noted 
the elaborate efforts in the warrant agreement to anticipate changes 
that might affect the rights of warrant holders and saw "a general 
intent that the option rights of persons in the position of these 
plaintiffs should not be diminished."166 This interpretation of the 
contract to find a broad and protective principle based on a percep-
tion of general intent is meaningful when contrasted to other par-
ticularly severe decisions.167 
limited exercise of the warrants issued in the late 1920's because of the lower market 
values generally experienced in the 1930's and 1940's, caused by the Depression and the 
limitation on profits associated with the Second World ·war. Many warrants must have 
expired by the time the optioned stock regained its exercise price. 
162. For a discussion of the law at this point in time, see Berle, supra note 3; 
Garner &: Forsythe (pts. 1·2), supra notes 63 &: 100. 
163. Van Slyke v. Norris, 159 Minn. 63, 198 N.W. 409 (1924). Accord, Gay v. Burgess 
Mills, 30 R.I. 231, 74 A. 714 (1909); Chaffee v. Middlesex R.R., 146 Mass. 224, 16 N.E, 
84 (1888). 
164. Bradford v. Crown•Bremson Indus., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 1009, 1012 (M.D. Tenn. 
1964); Tribble v. J.W. Greer Co., 83 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (D. Mass. 1949); Stephenson 
v. Plastics Corp. of America, 276 Minn. 400, 150 N.W.2d 668 (1967), 
165. 276 Minn. 400, 150 N.W .2d 668 (1967). 
166. 276 Minn. at 418, 150 N.W .2d at 681. 
167. See, e.g., Bradford v. Crown-Bremson Indus., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 1009 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1964); Parkinsi;m v. W~t End St. Ry., 173 Mass. 446, 53 N.E. 891 (1899), 
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In contrast to the limited evolution of state law, notable develop-
ment has occurred under federal law. In a reorganization under the 
bankruptcy law168 or the Holding Company Act,169 the warrant's 
claim on equity may command some value depending upon whether 
there is an expectation that the market price of the common will 
exceed the exercise price in the foreseeable future.170 More signifi-
cantly, even though the SEC does not treat the warrant as common 
stock, 171 both the SEC and a leading lower court have taken the 
position that the warrant is at least a junior equity security.172 
The increasing incidence of warrants in public hands,173 the 
growing respectability of issuers,174 the custom of providing certain 
provisions _in warrant agreements,175 and the realization that given 
a judicious choice of terms the warrant holder is giving not token but 
very valuable consideration to issuers of bond-warrant units, all 
coalesce to suggest that legislatures, governmental agencies, and stock 
exchanges might usefully do more to assist and precede the courts 
in taking action that will minimize the prospect of abuse to warrant 
holders and maximize the intelligent handling of warrants by their 
owners. 
As a minimum quid pro quo for the leverage phenomenon that 
the issuer can count on when pricing his package to the public, 
issuers should be required to accord the holder protection against 
dilution. An antidilution provision may protect different interests: 
it may provide the warrant holder with a claim on a fixed percentage 
of the total underlying shares, or assure the position of the warrant 
holders relative to the common stockholders.176 The older "percent-
age" view, which has several variations, requires an adjustment in 
the number of shares optioned whenever additional stock is sold, and 
modification of the option price whenever shares are issued at a price 
above or below the option price.177 The "market price" approach 
168. Chandler Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970). 
169. Public Utility Holding Co. Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1970). 
170. Niagara Hudson Power Corp. v. Leventritt, 340 U.S. 336, 343-44 (1951); In re 
Electric Power&: Light Corp., 176 F.2d 687, 691 (2d Cir.), petition for stay of dissolution 
denied, 337 U.S. 903 (1949). 
171. In re United Corp., 232 F.2d 601, 609 (3d Cir. 1956); Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 
F. Supp. 361, 373-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
172. In re Childs Co., 24 S.E.C. 85, 120-22 (1946); Entel v. Guilden, 223 F. Supp. 129, 
132 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Accord, Verrey v. Ellsworth, 303 F. Supp. 497, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
173 See notes 71-72 supra. 
174. See notes 1-2 supra and accompanying text. 
175. See notes 16-28 supra and accompanying text. 
176. Compare Kaplan, Piercing the Corporate Boilerplate: Anti-Dilution Clauses in 
Convertible Securities, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1965), with Ratner, Dilution and .t1.nti-
Dilution: A Reply to Prof. Kaplan, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 494 (1966). 
177. This approach gives the warrants a claim on a percentage of equity, at the 
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operates from the premise that the option holder should be treated 
as if he were a common stockholder; consequently, an adjustment in 
the exercise price and the number of shares optioned is appropriate 
only when existing common stockholders are directly benefited at 
the expense of the option holder, as, for example, when common stock 
dividends are paid or stock is sold to current stockholders in a rights 
offering at a price below the then-current market price. As to the ef-
fect of these theories, it is certainly true, as at least one court has 
suggested, that adjusting the exercise price is much more modest pro-
tection than protecting the claim on a percentage of the equity.178 
The market price provision appears to be customary today, and in the 
usual situation its more limited protections appear to be justified. 
The percentage approach would give warrant holders a greater bene-
fit than that possessed by holders of common stock without pre-emp-
tive rights, whereas comparable treatment of warrants and common 
stock regarding respective claims on a percentage of the company is 
more equitable for at least two reasons. First, since the warrant is 
now viewed as a junior equity security, it should not have char-
acteristics that give it preferred status. Second, the shifting to 
the market theory from the percentage theory parallels the general 
movement away from pre-emptive rights for common stock with its 
attendant removal of the stock's claim on a fixed percentage of equity. 
Additional protection against dilution is assured by requiring 
issuers to provide holders of registered warrants with the corporate 
information ordinarily provided to stockholders such as annual and 
quarterly financial statements, proxy statements, and any other com-
munications sent to shareholders.179 This information is desirable 
time of issuance, equal to the number of shares that the warrants could then purchase 
if immediately exercised, divided by the sum of the shares outstanding and the shares 
underlying the warrants. 
178. Merrit-Chapman &: Scott Corp. v. New York Trust Co., 184 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 931 (1951). The court observed: 
If the corporation were at liberty to declare stock dividends without making provi-
sion for warrant holders, the percentage of interest in the common-stock capital of 
the corporate enterprise which the warrant holders would acquire, if they there-
after purchased the shares subject to warrants, could be reduced practically to the 
point of extinction. Of course part of the injustice could be avoided by reducing 
the price to be paid for each share purcliased under the warrants, but the privilege 
the warrant holders originally had of acquiring a definite proportional interest 
in the common stock capital of the corporate enterprise would be lost without re• 
course unless their contract with the corporation contained some provision to 
protect it. 
184 F.2d at 957. 
179. See, e.g., American Telephone and Telegraph Co., Prospectus, April 13, 1970, at 
20; Chrysler Financial Corp., Prospectus, supra note 4, at 22-23; Greyhound Corp., 
Consent Statement, supra note 17, at 80; LTV Aerospace Corp., Prospectus, supra note 
25, at 26. 
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since a warrant's value resides in its claim on the underlying common 
stock, and information giving insight into the evolving value of the 
common is therefore very important to the warrant holder. Indeed, 
because a warrant holder will be wiped out by a market price below 
his exercise price-whereas the perpetual life of the common stock 
permits its owner to persevere, albeit impatiently, through a period of 
depressed stock prices-information germane to the value of the com-
mon is arguably more significant to the warrant holder than to the 
common stockholder. 
C. Tax Characteristics 
In attempting to identify and comment upon major issues arising 
from warrant use today, several reasons dictate that particular atten-
tion be given to the impact of federal income taxation upon the 
warrant's owner. All warrant holders, except perhaps tax-exempt 
charities who are unlikely owners, are affected by the tax laws. At 
the same time, several controversial tax principles relating to war-
rants have recently been in a state of flux and are presently less than 
optimal in their consequences, the rationale for tax treatment of 
the exercise of warrants needs to be modified, and the force of that 
rationale must be compared with the rules governing conversions. 
The manner in which warrants are treated in the Internal Rev-
enue Code is indicative of the curious pragmatism that characterizes 
tax statutes. The Code addresses itself to options in three contexts 
in which a warrant will often be involved: corporate-acquisition in-
debtedness, 180 original-issue discount,181 and wash sales.182 And yet, 
despite its considerable and increasing specificity, the Code is silent 
with regard to such important and frequent events as exercise, reor-
ganizations, and short sales.183 
1. Issuance of Bond-Warrant Units 
Section 1232, entitled "Bonds and Other Evidences of Indebted-
ness," governs issuance of bond-warrant units. This provision was 
adopted by Congress as part of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954184 
180. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 279. 
181. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 1232. 
182. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1091. 
183. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1233. 
184. For a very competent treatment of section 1232's implications beyond bond-
warrant units, see Kimmelfield, Original Issue Discounts: Convertible Debentures and 
Warrants; Package Deals, N.Y.U. 2lsr INsr. ON FED. TAX. 1451 (1963); de Kosmian, 
Original Issue Discount, 22 TAX LAw. 339 (1969). An able discussion of the implica-
1446 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 70:1411 
in an effort to restrict the then favorable tax treatment accorded 
straight bonds possessing an original-issue discount-that is, those 
bonds with an issue price185 or cost to the initial purchaser less than 
the redemption price at maturity.186 Prior to 1954, there was a strong 
possibility that the original-issue discount on a bond that qualified 
as a capital asset in the taxpayer's hands could be taxed at capital-
gain rates, with recognition of any gain being postponed until the 
bond was either sold or redeemed.187 This treatment was available 
even if the discount was clearly attributable to a low interest rate.188 
Section 1232 changed this state of affairs. Under this provision, if 
original-issue discount exists, the taxpayer is required to recognize 
the amount of that discount as ordinary income when the bond is 
sold or redeemed at maturity.189 The feeling that the discount was 
tions of the 1969 amendments and the shift to current ta.xation of original-issue discount 
may be found in Landis, Original Issue Discount After the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 
24 TAX LA.w. 435 (1971). 
185. The definition of "issue price" varies, depending upon whether the bonds arc 
sold in a registered public offering or in a private placement under section 4(2) of tl1c 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970). For public offerings, issue price is 
"the initial offering price to the public ••• at which price a substantial amount of 
such bonds or other evidences of indebtedness were sold," while for private placements, 
issue price is "the price paid by the first buyer of such bond." INT. REv. CODE of 1954, 
§ 1232(b}(2). No mention is made of the governing definition when the issue is not 
registered with the SEC for reasons other than the private placement exemption. For 
example, exemption from registration might be claimed under the intrastate offering 
exemption of section 3(a)(ll), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a}(ll) (1970). 
186. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1232(b)(l). Original-issue discount must be distin-
guished from the discount on a purchase in the so-called "after market" (the market 
for the security existing after issue). This after-market or market discount arises when 
the price paid by the subsequent purchaser is less than the bond's face value (ordinarily 
the redemption price at maturity). A bond with original-issue discount may have more, 
less, or no market discount. The gain attending market discount is usually taxed as 
capital gain. Rev. Rul. 60-210, 1960-1 CUM. BuLI.. 38, 39. 
187. Commissioner v. Caulkins, 144 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1944), a/lg. 1 T.C. 656 (1943). 
See also Paine v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 398 (8th Cir. 1956), revg. 23 T.C. 391 (1954) 
(capital gain treatment if notes are sold shortly before maturity). 
Prior to 1934, retirement of a bond was not a sale or e.xchange and consequently 
gain or loss was ordinary in nature. Section 117(£), enacted by the Revenue Act of 1934, 
made redemption of most bonds a sale or exchange. Capital gain possibilities under 
the 1939 Code in relation to section 1232 of the 1954 Code are discussed in Zafft, Dis• 
count Bonds-Ordinary Income or Capital Gains?, 11 TAX L. REv. 51 (1955). 
188. Commissioner v. Caulkins, 144 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1944), aflg. 1 T.C. 656 (1943). 
For example, had Buyer purchased for $900 a 3% corporate bond redeemable at face 
value ($1000) in twenty years, the $100 gain realized at redemption would have been 
taxed as a long-term capital gain. 
189. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1232(a)(2)(B). Gain in excess of original-issue discount, 
if any, received capital gain treatment. 
The adoption of section 1232 may have had an impact on judicial attitude toward 
cases litigated after its adoption but involving issues controlled by the 1939 Code. In 
several of these cases the courts explicitly declined to follow Caulkins and taxed the 
discount element of the bondholder's gain on sale or retirement as ordinary income, 
See, e.g., Commissioner v. Morgan, 272 F.2d 936, 940 (9th Cir. 1959); Rosen v. United 
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"a form of interest income"190 was the rationale for the shift from 
capital gains to ordinary-income treatment.191 Although nowhere 
specified, it appears that the "yield theory," long accepted in the 
financial community, underlies this approach. According to this 
theory, a bond sells at a discount because the stated interest rate on 
the bond is lower at the time of purchase than the going rate in the 
market place for bonds of similar character.192 In other words, over 
the remaining life of the bond the combination of stated interest and 
appreciation (which will be equal to the discount) should give a re-
turn equivalent to the going rate for bonds of similar quality as of 
the time of purchase.193 Congress apparently reasoned that since under 
the yield theory the discount is a substitute for interest,194 and since 
interest is taxed as ordinary income,195 original-issue discount should 
be a permanent quality of the bond and should be treated as ordinary 
income.196 
States, 288 F.2d 658, 662 (3d. Cir. 1961). In the Tax Reform Act of 1969 Congress speci• 
fled that original-issue discount must be recognized ratably over the life of the bond, 
not just upon sale or redemption. INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 1232(a)(3). 
190. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1954). 
191. The shift was not a complete one. Section 1232 embodies a de minimis rule, 
which applies if the original-issue discount is less than ¼ of I% multiplied by the 
number of years to maturity. INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 1232(b)(l). In this circumstance 
the general rule of section 1232 (a)(l) is operative. It treats retirement as an _exchange 
and, reflecting prior law, provides capital gain treatment for corporate debt. 
192. E. WILLETT, FUNDAMENTAI.S OF SECURITIES MARKErs 121 (1968). 
193. Id. 
194. Original-issue discount appears to fit within the general definition of interest 
as "compensation for the use or forebearance of money." Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 
488, 498 (1940). Moreover, the Senate Finance Committee referred to the deduction 
the issuer receives as a consequence of original-issue discount as comparable to interest 
expense. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1954). However, the phrase "com• 
parable to interest" may indicate Congress intentionally stopped short of considering 
such discount as the direct equivalent of interest. This impression is reinforced by the 
statutory treatment accorded bond discount for two similar securities: government 
bonds with a stated interest but issued at a discount, and noninterest-bearing obliga-
tions issued at a discount and redeemable for fixed amounts increasing at stated 
intervals (U.S. Government Series E bonds, for example). In neither situation is the 
discount styled interest in the Code. See INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, §§ 454, 1232(a){2)(B). 
A similar caution was evidenced by the Supreme Court's discussion of discount under 
the 1939 Code in United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54 (1965). The Court 
held that "earned original issue discount, like stated interest, should be taxed under 
Section 22(a) as ordinary income." 381 U.S. at 58. But it apparently did not consider 
them equivalents since it observed that the discount "serves the same function as stated 
interest." 381 U.S. at 57. On the other hand, the Treasury refers to original-issue 
discount on U.S. Government and corporate bonds as interest. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-7(c) 
(1957). It has also long taken this position with regard to municipal bonds. G.C.M. 
10542, Xl-1 Ctn.r. BULL. 18 (1932); I.T. 2629, Xl-1 CUM. BuLL. 20 (1932). See de Kosmian, 
supra note 184, at 344. Furthermore, with regard to nonresident aliens and foreign 
corporations, the Treasury treats original-issue discount as interest for tax treaty pur-
poses. Rev. Rul. 68-333, 1968·1 CuM. BuLL. 390, based on T.I.R. 877 (Dec. '}J, 1966). 
195. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, §§ 6l(a)(4), 63. 
196. As a general rule subsequent holders must report as income the ratable share 
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Congress realistically took the view that a taxpayer who pur-
chases a bond-warrant unit acquires two separate securities, the bond 
and the warrant. The taxpayer is required to allocate the cost or 
issue price of the financial package between its two components in 
order to determine the cost or issue price of each. The allocation is 
made by determining what proportion of the unit's total fair market 
value is represented by each element;197 this percentage of the unit's 
cost is deemed to be the issue price of the particular element.198 If 
the issue price attributable to the bond is less than the redemption 
price at maturity, and if the de minimis rule199 is not operative, the 
difference-that is, the original-issue discount-must, as a conse-
quence of amendment by the Tax Reform Act of 1969,200 be amor-
tized ratably on a monthly basis201 and recognized as ordinary income 
even by a cash basis taxpayer.202 The computed issue price for each 
element becomes its basis,203 and, assuming the warrant is a capital 
asset in the taxpayer's hands, capital gain or loss will be recognized 
when the warrant or the stock acquired with it is subsequently sold 
or exchanged.204 The bond's basis will be adjusted upward as dis-
count income is recognized, thereby reducing the capital gain or in-
creasing the capital loss eventually recognized when the bond is sold 
or exchanged. 
Congressional treatment of bond-warrant units reflects the notion 
that a warrant is a separate security that may have considerable mar-
of the discount for the period they hold the bond. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1232(a)(3). 
An exception to the rule exists for those who subsequently purchase the bond at a 
premium; no income is recognized. !NT. REY. CoDE of 1954, § 1232(a)(2)(C)(ii). The 
general rule is also modified if the subsequent purchase of the bond is made with a 
market discount smaller than the original-issue discount. Here the smaller market dis, 
count is amortized as ordinary income. INT REY. CODE of 1954, § 1232(a)(3)(B), 
197. When the fair market value of the warrant is not "readily ascertainable" within 
the meaning of Treas. Reg. § l.421-6(c) (1966), the issue price of the bond must be 
determined in a different manner. The taxpayer must identify an assumed price at 
which the bond would have been issued had it been issued independent of the unit. 
Reasonable criteria for making this determination are provided. Treas. Reg. § 1.1282-3 
(b)(2)(ii)(a) (1968). 
198, INT. REY. CODE of 1954, § 1232(b)(2). 
199. See note 191 supra. 
200. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 413(a), 83 Stat. 609. 
201. INT. REY. CoDE of 1954, § 1232(a)(3)(A). 
202. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1232(a)(3). Prior to the 1969 amendment, section 1232 
provided that the cash basis taxpayer would recognize ordinary income when the bond 
was either sold or redeemed, and the amount then recognized would depend upon the 
period of time the bond was owned and the quantum of gain: the taxpayer recognized 
as ordinary income that percentage of original-issue discount equal to the percentage 
of time that the taxpayer held the bond between original issue and redemption. 
203. Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-l(d) (1971). 
204, INT, ~. CODE of 1954, § 1223(3); text accompanying note 223 infra. 
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ket value even if it has no exercise value, and the additional judg-
ment that the value embodied in the warrant is essentially a substi-
tute for the foregone interest.205 Perhaps, an argument can be made 
that, because the issuer included the warrant in lieu of a cash interest 
payment,206 the warrant's value should be ta."SCed as imputed interest 
when received. However, viewing the warrant as indirectly creating 
an interest liability through the bond discount provision is more 
realistic and conceptually appropriate; it is consistent with the pur-
chaser's perception that he has acquired two distinct securities207 and 
the reality of the issuer's position: warrants (and possibly stock 
through exercise) are being sold in addition to the interest that is 
being saved.208 
The eminently reasonable yield and unit concepts are, however, 
wedded to a very questionable recognition provision. This provision 
is likely to hinder the sale of bond-warrant units by making the bond 
portion of the unit-which would usually possess an original-issue 
discount-less attractive to investors than bonds not having such a 
discount. It seems an unwarranted inroad on the integrity of the cash 
method of reporting income to require a cash basis taxpayer to pay 
income tax on imputed interest when he will receive the cash repre-
senting that interest only when the bond is subsequently sold or 
redeemed: the o·wner of a twenty-year bond with original-issue dis-
count who holds it to maturity, for example, will pay his tax on a 
ratable portion of the discount in year one but the cash representing 
that interest would not be received until year twenty. From a present-
value point of view, this recognition provision is very harsh.209 More-
over, this treatment goes beyond other areas, such as, for example, 
the installment sale provisions,210 where interest has also been im-
puted: if a deferred-payment sales contract makes no provision for 
interest or specifies an unrealistically low rate, a portion of the de-
ferred payments is deemed ordinary interest income rather than 
part of the sales price,211 but unlike the situation under section 1232, 
the imposition of tax on imputed interest coincides, with few ex-
205. See notes 104-05 8: 124·30 supra and accompanying text. 
206. See notes 124-25 supra. 
207. See notes 86-97 8: 152 supra and accompanying text. 
208. See note 130 supra and accompanying text. 
209. Using a 5% discount rate, the $10 of income taxed in year 1 but only received 
in year 20 has a present value of only $3.77. Thus, a taxpayer in a 40% marginal tax 
bracket is paying more in ta.-.c ($4.00) than the value of what he will receive. 
210. !NT. REv. COl>E of 1954, §§ 453, 483. 
211. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 483(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.483-l(c) (1966). 
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ceptions, with the receipt of each deferred payment.212 The recogni-
tion of imputed interest under section 1232 is also inconsistent with 
the treatment specified by Congress for the closely analogous situa-
tions of interest-bearing government bonds issued at a discount and 
noninterest-bearing government obligations issued at a discount; in 
both cases, the taxpayer holding such bonds is permitted to postpone 
reporting the discount as income until sale, exchange, or redemp• 
tion.21a 
Three reasons apparently combined to prompt congressional 
adoption of the annual recognition of imputed income amendment 
to section 1232. The annual-recognition provision seeks to avoid the 
nonparallel treatment of deductions and income resulting from 
original-issue discount, for the discount is available to the issuer 
ratably over the life of the bond, whereas a cash-basis holder ordi-
narily would not recognize the income until the bond was sold 
or exchanged. Second, Congress desired to make bondholders more 
aware of the ordinary-income character of original-issue discount: 
the House Committee believed that many holders would fail to 
report the original-issue discount at the time of disposition; even if 
it was reported, the discount was likely to be reported as a capital 
gain, rather than ordinary income. The third reason, dependent 
upon the first two, was to discourage the use of bonds in corporate 
acquisitions.214 
None of these declared reasons appear to justify the amendment. 
The second and third reasons are particularly weak. It is not self-
evident why the creation of multiple annual tax events in lieu of 
one tax on disposition solves the problem of cognizance of an ordi-
nary-income responsibility. Either way, an initial awareness of one's 
"interest" responsibility is necessary, and the medium of education 
actually selected for registered bonds-annual corporate notification 
to the taxpayer215-seems equally appropriate whether ta.x is due at 
disposition or annually. Neither is the acquisition argument persua-
sive. As the staff report prepared for the Senate Finance Committee 
observed when summarizing the arguments for and against the House 
Bill, the "provision at best, is an artificial way to discourage corpo-
rate mergers."216 The mismatched timing in the recognition of in-
212. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 483(c). 
213. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 454, 1232(a)(2)(B). 
214. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 109 (1969); S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 
1st Sess. 147 (1969). 
215. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 6049(a)(l)(C), 6049{c). 
216. Hearings on H. R. 13270, the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Before the Senate Comm. 
on Finance, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 73. 
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come and deductions appears the strongest argument of the three. 
However, even here one must doubt whether the postponement in 
receipt of revenue is sufficiently great to justify this deviation from 
the general rule that the amount of any item of gross income shall 
be included in gross income for the taxable year in which it is re-
ceived by the taxpayer,217 and from the associated general rule that 
taxable income shall be computed under the method of accounting 
by which the taxpayer regularly computes his income.218 The im-
puted-income provision is, in a very practical present-value sense, a 
major deviation from the sound and equitable principle implicit in 
the cash method of accounting: taxpayers should not be required to 
pay a tax on income not yet available to them. 
2. Methods of Disposition and Their Significance 
A warrant can be eliminated or disposed of in three basic ways: 
expiration, sale, and exercise. The tax consequences of these events, 
as well as the effect of using the warrant in wash sales, short sales, 
and corporate acquisitions, depend upon the basic conceptualization 
of the warrant. For example, is acquisition of the warrant treated 
as the acquisition of the underlying property, or is the warrant per-
ceived to be an independent asset? The answers to these kinds of 
important questions are presently provided by statutory doctrines, 
judicial formulations, and occasionally by Treasury pronouncements. 
Very few questions of disposition are answered by authority directed 
specifically to warrants. Usually, resort must be made to general com-
ments about options, or other specific types of options such as rights; 
this use of analogy is significant because exercise of the different 
kinds of options on equity are governed by different theories with 
disparate origins, and these theories occasionally produce meaning-
fully diverse tax consequences. For example, exercise of a warrant 
to buy portfolio stock owned by the issuer of the warrant, as opposed 
to the issuer's own stock, appears to be a nontaxable event,219 whereas 
exercise of a convertible security in similar circumstances is pres-
ently treated as a taxable event.220 Basic perceptions and theories are 
important, for theories governing one type of option may be trans-
ferable to others; when the evolution of the law produces such a 
217. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 45l(a). 
218. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 446(a). 
219. See text accompanying notes 227-35 infra, discussing the purchase theory. 
220. See Rose v. Trust Co., 77 F,2d 355 (5th Cir. 1935); Prescott v. Commissioner, 76 
F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1935); Estate of H.H. Timken, 47 B.T.A. 494: (1942), a/fd. on other 
grounds sub. nom. Commissioner v. Timken, 141 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 194:4); Birmingham 
Fire Ins. Co., 10 P-H B.T.A. Mem. 1[ 41,583 (1941). 
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transfer, different tax consequences may occasionally be transferred 
as well. 
Section 1234 of the Code directs that the classification of an op-
tion as a capital or noncapital asset shall be determined derivatively 
by reference to the character the underlying property would have 
in the taxpayer's hands.221 Since warrants are options within the 
meaning of section 1234,222 their sale by a ta..'{payer in whose hands 
they are capital assets will produce long-term gain or loss if the war-
rant has been held for more than six months;223 the amount of the 
gain or loss is the difference between the adjusted basis of the war-
rant and the amount realized on its sale.224 With regard to the expira-
tion of warrants, that event has been accommodated to the Code's 
basic structure by treating it for recognition and holding-period pur-
poses as a sale or exchange occurring on the day of expiration.220 
3. Exercise of the Warrant 
a. The purchase theory and the continuing-offer premise. In 
contrast to expiration and sale, there is no statutory provision deal-
ing directly with the exercise of options in general or warrants in 
particular. One type of option, the employee stock option, does re-
ceive specific statutory attention. Section 42l(a) states the general 
rule that no income shall result upon exercise. The absence of a 
statutory grant of tax-free status to the exercise of other options, 
including warrants, necessitates resort to the general language of 
sections 100 I and I 002. The former provides that gain is "realized" 
from dealings in property upon a "sale or other disposition."220 Sec-
tions lO0l(c) and 1002 then command the "recognition" of gain or 
loss whenever a "sale or exchange" occurs unless it is "othenvise pro-
vided" elsewhere in the Code. The absence of a specific nonrecogni-
tion provision makes the threshold question of realization especially 
significant. 
It is a well-established general rule that the exercise of rights and 
warrants does not precipitate the imposition of a tax. Palmer v. 
Commissioner227 so held with regard to rights and Miles v. Safe De-
221. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 1234(a). 
222. Cf. William H. Bateman, 40 T.C. 408 (1963); E.P. Raymond, 37 B.T.A. 423 
(1938); Rev. Rul. 56-406, 1956-2 CUM. Buu.. 523, 525, 
223. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1222(3)-(4). 
224. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1001, 1011. 
225. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1234(b). 
226. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ lOOl(a)-(b). 
227. 302 U.S. 63, 71 (1937). 
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posit b Trust Co.228 had earlier so indicated in dictum.229 The theory 
of these cases was that exercise of an option is essentially a purchase 
of the underlying stock.230 Given this perception, it followed that 
the profit, if any, inherent at the time of purchase of the stock is not 
realized and recognized until the subsequent sale or other disposi-
tion of the purchased property. 
While it is true that stock has been purchased, it is also true 
that the option has been eliminated. Arguably, this surrender of the 
option to the issuer is a "disposition." In Palmer and Miles, the Su-
preme Court did not expand upon its purchase rationale to explain 
why of the two events, elimination of the option and acquisition of 
the stock, the tax focus should be upon the second rather than the 
first. An intellectual bridge between the two events was subsequently 
built by the Fourth Circuit in Helvering v. Bartlett:231 
An option is but a continuing offer; and, when the offer is accepted, 
it is merged in the contract which results. We have then, nothing 
upon which to predicate an assessment of the tax but a purchase 
of stock by the taxpayer; and it is well settled that such a transaction 
does not give rise to taxable income until a profit is realized by the 
sale of the stock purchased.232 
The "continuing offer therefore purchase" theory was relied upon 
by the Fifth Circuit in Commissioner v. Cummings233 when it sub-
sequently concluded that exercise of warrants issued in a bond-
warrant unit was also not a taxable event.234 Palmer, Bartlett, and 
Cummings, especially the latter two, concluded that gain had not 
been realized. Since it is evident that no "sale"285 of an option occurs 
228. 259 U.S. 247, 252 (1922). 
229. Exceptions to this general rule are discussed in notes 245-49 infra and accom-
panying text. 
230. Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 63, 67 (1937); Miles v. Safe Deposit &: Trust 
Co., 259 U.S. 247, 252 (1922). A similar perception of warrants is contained in other 
bodies of law. For purposes of section 16(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78p(b) (1970), stock is deemed to be bought upon exercise of the warrant, not ac-
quisition of the warrant. See, e.g., Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
231. 71 F.2d 598 (4th Cir. 1934). 
232. 71 F.2d at 600. See also Oscar E. Baan, 51 T.C. 1032 (1969). 
233. 77 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1935). 
234. The theory appears to fit and govern the exercise of calls, although no cases 
or Treasury pronouncements discuss the reason why the exercise of a call is a nontaxed 
event. Cf., e.g., Rev. Rul. 58-234, 1958-1 CUM. BULL. 279. 
235. The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965), analyzed 
the term "sale" and observed: 
A '''sale" ••• is a common event in the non-tax world; and since it is used in the 
Code without limiting definition and without legislative history indicating a con-
trary result, its common and ordinary meaning should at least be persuasive of 
its meaning as used in the Internal Revenue Code •••• 
"A sale, in the ordinary sense of the word, is a transfer of property for a fixed 
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on exercise, the courts by implication held that exercise is not a 
"disposition" of property within the meaning of the predecessors 
of sections IOOl(a) and (b). Consequently, under the continuing-offer 
rationale it is unnecessary to consider the subsequent statutory rec-
ognition question whether an "exchange" has occurred. Moreover, 
the search for an "otherwise provided" nonrecognition authoriza-
tion is equally moot. 
The nub of the "continuing offer therefore purchase" theory 
appears to be the common law concept of contracts that an option 
is essentially a unilateral offer to sell that ripens into an enforceable 
agreement only when the offer has been accepted in the manner 
specified in the contract.236 The heavy reliance by the Fourth and 
Fifth Circuits upon common law contract theory seems inappro-
priate. Taxation is much too practical a body of law to permit 
important questions to pivot on such a theoretical point. The Su-
preme Court's discussion of the realization issue attending a transfer 
of stock in terms of whether it was an "appropriate occasion for tax-
ing the accretion"237 supports a more practical orientation. Indeed, 
in Commissioner v. LoBue238 an employer's motivation in transferring 
an option to an employee, and the subsequent transfer of the op-
tioned stock, was central to the Supreme Court's conclusion that the 
exercise value inherent at the time of exercise was compensation. 
Realization issues should be especially responsive to factors such as 
taxpayer convenience, ease of administration, ta.x avoidance, and 
the underlying purpose of the transaction. 
b. An alternative to the continuing-offer premise. An alternative 
to the continuing-offer justification for the purchase theory is readily 
available in the financing purposes and realities of warrant offerings. 
A corporation issues warrants in bond-warrant units for a threefold 
purpose: as a means of raising capital through sale of an independent 
security, the warrant; as a means of selling and reducing the stated 
interest on straight debt, the sweetener; and as a means of raising 
price in money or its equivalent," Iowa v. McFarland, 110 U.S. 471, 478 [1881]: it 
is a contract to "pass rights of property for money,-which the buyer pays or 
promises to pay to the seller •••• " Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 495, 544 [49 U.S. 
495, 544 (1849)]. 
380 U.S. at 570-71 (emphasis original). 
236. Bradford v. Crown-Bremson Indus., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 1009, 1012·13 (M.D. Tenn. 
1964); Berle, supra note 3, at 652. Cf. United States Freight Co. v. United States, 422 
F.2d 887, 894 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Morris R. DeWoskin, 85 T.C. 856, 868 (1960); Rev. Rul. 
58-284, 1958-1 CUM. Buu.. 279, 281. 
287. United States v. Davis, 870 U.S. 65, 68 (1962) (emphasis added). 
238. 351 U.S. 243 (1956). 
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capital at a later date through exercise of the warrant.239 Should the 
warrants not be exercised, only one facet of this purpose, the subse-
quent raising of capital by sale of stock, is defeated. However, the 
issuer's primary financing objective is normally accomplished when 
initial bond-warrant unit sale occurs. The utility of the cash inflow 
upon exercise of the warrant is limited due to its postponement, the 
uncertainty about cash needs at that later date, and the possibility 
that exercise will be foreclosed by a price drop in the underlying 
security. Nevertheless, exercise and the attendant raising of capital 
via a sale of stock is doubtlessly contemplated; since once warrants 
are issued, all parties' interests are maximized by a strong advance 
in the market value of the optioned stock, it would be extraordinary 
for management to desire, and unlikely that such an optimistic 
breed would expect, stock to sell at a price that would preclude 
exercise. 
From the option holder's viewpoint, exercise, either by the initial 
or a subsequent option holder, fulfills a twofold purpose: conserva-
tion of the economic value represented by the exercise value; and 
acquisition of the underlying stock for its future economic value. A 
stock purchase is ultimately necessary to accomplish either purpose. 
Thus from the perspective of both issuer and purchaser, from the 
outset a bond-warrant unit offering has the objective of effecting a 
purchase of stock. 
When the warrant is exercised for cash, liquidity considerations 
lend further practical support to the purchase theory. A portion of 
the taxpayer's liquid assets are expended to make the purchase, and 
taxation at exercise would exacerbate this cash drain.240 This should 
not be the outcome unless overriding reasons, such as the frustration 
of congressional purposes, compel it. The Supreme Court did impose 
taxation at exercise in the employee stock option area, but it did 
so on the grounds that compensation was intended and that the form 
of compensation actually provided was the free ride on the com-
mon.241 No compensation motivation exists in the ordinary warrant 
239. See notes 123·32 supra and accompanying text. If bonds are surrendered to 
exercise the warrant, no new capital is directly raised. However, the elimination of 
debt and the increase in common outstanding will improve its chances for raising 
capital through borrowing. 
240. When warrants are exercised by tendering bonds (or other securities) the liq-
uidity argument is much weaker, but still a significant consideration. 
241. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 248-49 (1956). Congress subsequently 
legislated rules determining whether warrants and other options arc treated as com-
pensation or investment. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 130A, added by Revenue Act 
of 1950, ch. 994, § 218, 64 Stat. 942. The key provision as amended is now INT. :REv. 
CODE of 1954, § 421. 
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offering since holders are only coincidentally employees. Perhaps 
Congress evidenced a critical attitude toward the tax-free nature of 
exercise when it subjected the exercise value of qualified and re-
stricted stock options to the possibility of a tax by designating it a 
tax preference item;242 however, only options granted to employees 
are so treated.243 This seems to suggest that Congress was responding 
only to the compensation possibility, which is not inherent in the 
warrant's normal use. In short, except for warrants granted to em-
ployees as a form of compensation, there appear to be no consid-
erations that meaningfully detract from or override the inherent 
equity of the liquidity argument as support for the purchase the-
ory.244 
c. Exceptions to the purchase theory. In deciding whether the 
exercise of options should be a taxable occasion, Congress and the 
courts carved out two exceptions to the purchase theory. The first 
involves the previously considered occasional use of warrants as a 
means of compensation.245 The second is a judicially created dividend 
rationale that thus far relates solely to rights and would be applicable 
to warrants only in remote circumstances. The Supreme Court has 
recently held that when a corporation creates a subsidiary, places 
assets in the subsidiary, and then sells subsidiary stock to shareholders 
through the issuance of rights whose exercise price is less than the 
fair market value of the underlying optioned stock at the time the 
rights were issued, section 355 will not prevent recognition; and 
since the "net worth" of the corporation is diminished, the corpora-
tion is engaging in a distribution of assets taxable as a dividend 
under sections 301 and 316.246 The quantum of this dividend was 
the difference between the amount paid for the shares upon exercise 
of the rights and the fair market value of the shares at the time 
when the rights were exercised.247 There is at present uncertainty 
about whether the dividend income arises upon distribution of 
the rights or upon their subsequent sale or exercise. The Supreme 
· 242. See INT. REv. ConE of 1954, § 57(a)(b). 
243. See INT. REv. ConE of 1954, §§ 57(a)(b), 422(b), 424(b). 
244. Under some circumstances, the issuance of a warrant may give rise to ordinary 
income under a dividend theory. See notes 246-48 infra and accompanying text. Where 
the dividend rationale is convincing, taxation should occur at issuance, not at exercise, 
Consequently, a dividend rationale does not detract from the liquidity argument's 
support for the purchase theory. 
245. See notes 241-43 supra and accompanying text. 
246. Commisioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 88-91 (1968). The Court also held that 
the transactions there involved did not come within section 355, but left open the ques• 
tion whether nonrecognition was appropriate under sections 354 or 346. 
247. 391 U.S. at 89-90, 98. 
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Court considers the timing issue an open question,248 but the Trea-
sury has recently adopted the position that income is taxable upon 
issuance of the rights.249 
The dividend theory does not fit the usual situation of warrants 
issued in bond-warrant units. The income question posed by such 
units is of an interest, rather than a dividend, nature.250 Moreover, 
warrants rarely have an exercise price below the optioned stock's 
market value. In addition, whereas stockholders typically pay nothing 
for rights, warrant holders pay an allocated portion of the unit's 
cost for the warrants. It is also significant that recipients of rights 
are typically stockholders of the issuer, while bond-warrant units 
are usually sold to a broader class of investors, who might coin-
cidentally be shareholders and thus affected by a dividend theory. 
However, if a company issued warrants to shareholders independent 
of a unit, exercisable at less than the common's market value, and 
without receiving appropriate consideration, the dividend rationale 
could properly be applied; it is difficult to identify any financing 
utility to an issuer from such a use. 
d. Application of the purchase theory to convertible securities. 
The fact that different rationales may lead to different tax conse-
quences make it meaningful to inquire whether the purchase theory, 
which governs exercise of warrants, rights, and probably calls, also 
reaches the exercise of such kindred options as convertible provi-
sions.251 Conversion of both convertible debentures and convertible 
preferred stock is treated as a nontaxable event when the underlying 
stock is that of the company issuing the convertible. Two different 
theories are used to justify the common result, and both theories 
differ in varying degrees from the purchase theory. The Treasury 
has taken the position, through regulations, that conversion of pre-
ferred to the same company's common is a recapitalization and there-
fore qualifies as a reorganization under section 368(a)(l)(E);252 con-
sequently it is exempted from the general rule of recognition stated 
in section 1002.253 In contrast, a conversion of bonds is exempt from 
248. 391 U.S. at 89-90. It has been stated that should the exercise value decrease, 
the dividend would be the lower of the spread at issuance or exercise. Choate v. 
Commissioner, 129 F.2d 684, 687 (2d Cir. 1942). 
249. Rev. Rul. 70-521, 1970-2 Cu111. BULL. 72. 
250. See notes 189-91 supra and accompanying text. 
251. An excellent discussion of the theories pertinent to exercise of convertible 
securities is contained in Fleischer & Cary, The Taxation of Convertible Bonds and 
Stock, 74 HARV. L. REv. 473 (1961). 
252. Treas. Reg. § l.368-2(e) (1955). 
253. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 354(a). 
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tax on an "open-transaction" theory that results in nonrealization. 
The Treasury has asserted: 
Where the owner of a bond exercises the right, provided for in the 
bond, of converting the bond into stock in the obligor corporation, 
such transaction does not result in a realization of profit or loss, the 
transaction not being closed for purposes of income taxation until 
such stock is sold,254 
The distinction between the reorganization and purchase theories is 
quite clear. The first depends on a statutory exemption from recog-
nition, the second on a judicially evolved theory of nonrealization. 
There is not as great a contrast between the open-transaction and 
purchase theories. Both focus on nonrealization, rather than on non-
recognition. Since one theory is the result of judicial development 
and the other a Treasury product, one is tantalized by the prospect 
that perhaps different labels represent very similar ideas. 
The premise initially underlying the open-transaction theory was 
stated by the Treasury as follows: 
Gain or loss arising from the acquisition and subsequent disposi-
tion of property is realized when as the result of a transaction between 
the owner and another person the property is converted into cash or 
other property (a) that is essentially different from the property dis-
posed of, and (b) that has a market value. In other words, both (a) 
a change in substance and not merely in form, and (b) a change into 
the equivalent of cash, are required to complete or close a transac-
tion from which income may be realized.250 
This article was dropped from the regulations with the enactment 
of subsequent revenue acts, but its conclusion and rationale are still 
operative,256 having been carried forward initially by explicit Trea-
sury determinations257 and more recently by implication.258 While 
the conclusion that conversion is a nontaxable event is quite sound, 
the assertion that it is an event of form rather than substance is 
suspect.259 A shift from debt to common stock, or, more meaningfully, 
254. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1563 (1920), amending Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1563 (1918), 
255. Id. 
256. Broenen v. Beaunit Corp., 440 F.2d 1244, 1246 (7th Cir. 1970), citing Fleischer 
&: Cary, supra note 251; Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 434 F.2d 1357, 1361 
(Ct. Cl. 1970), dting Fleischer&: Cary, supra note 251. 
257. E.g., G.C.M. 18436, 1937-1 CuM, BULL. 101, 102. 
258. Rev. Rul. 57-535, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 513, 516. 
259. Treasury Regulation 45 presented two criteria for determining whether a 
transaction is dosed. See text accompanying note 255 supra. Since the stock under-
lying a convertible debenture will typically have a market value (especially easy to 
determine in the case of a publicly traded stock), the conclusion that conversion of 
a debenture is a nontaxed event appears to rest on the form-versus-substance distinction, 
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from the fLxed-income nonappreciable bond into a variable-income 
appreciable common stock, is far more than a change in form or 
appearance, particularly since the conversion is nonreversible. For 
the security holder, a shift from creditor to shareholder status in a 
particular company (A.T. & T. for example), with the attendant 
major change in prospects for annual cash receipts, appreciation, and 
rights on liquidation, would usually be a much more significant -
economic event than a shift from bondholder status in that company 
ta bondholder status in an entirely independent but comparable 
quality company (General Motors for example). 
The purchase theory has much to commend it as the conceptual 
replacement for the open-transaction theory. There is no reason in 
contract law theory or business practice why the consideration for 
the "purchase" cannot be viewed as the cancellation of a debt or 
cancellation of one's rights as a preferred stockholder. Even the re-
finements of the purchase theory appear to fit. Common sense sug-
gests that a continuing offer is as much embodied in a convertible 
security as it is in a right or warrant. In addition, the raising of 
permanent capital is characteristic of each situation. Some intellec-
tual friction does arise because the convertibles have value as a bond 
or preferred stock independent of the option, whereas the right and 
warrant trace their value-even the warrant's unique leverage value 
-solely to the claim on common.260 However, section 171, dealing 
with amortizable bond premium, supports a perception of the con-
vertible as two securities pasted together. It stipulates that in no 
case shall the amount of bond premium on a convertible bond in-
clude any amount attributable to the bond's conversion feature; 261 
the value of the equity option must be identified and segregated 
from the bond element. This suggests the treatment of convertibles 
should parallel that of bond-warrant units: the cost of the convertible 
might be allocated to its bond and option components, with gain 
both realized and recognized on the bond feature when the option 
is exercised. Yet, this argument is undermined by section 1232. That 
provision implies, and the regulations expressly stipulate, that the 
conversion feature shall not be valued and subtracted from the se-
260. Fleischer and Cary give brief attention to the possibility of viewing a convertible 
debenture as directly analogous to a right and concluded that the bond feature is much 
too significant for the analogy to be drawn. Fleischer & Cary, supra note 251, at 489-90. 
They did not, however, explore the purchase rationale underlying the treatment of 
rights. 
261. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 17l(b)(l)(C). By analogy, preferred stock would also 
have two distinct characteristics. 
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curity's cost in order to create bond discount.262 A unitary view of 
the bond is manifested, but the stress is on the bond feature rather 
than on the option. 263 
The exercise of convertibles is presently an intellectual thicket 
because of those conflicting views of convertible debentures inherent 
in the Code: section 1232 ignores the option and views the hybrid 
security as only a debt instrument; section 171 recognizes two dis-
tinguishable features. The Supreme Court's purchase theory would 
not dispel all the present confusion, but it would reduce that confu-
sion by replacing the open-transaction theory and its questionable 
application of a form-versus-substance distinction with a firmly en-
trenched judicial doctrine. Yet, although the purchase theory is more 
appropriate than the open-transaction theory, there exists a poten-
tially better rationale: recapitalization. 
e. Alternatives to the purchase theory. Although the purchase 
theory of nonrealization-based on the continuing-offer premise and 
bolstered by the suggested premise of capital-raising purpose-ap-
pears to be soundly based, an assessment of possible alternative 
theories is appropriate for three reasons. First, reliance on a non-
realization theory is somewhat risky. The question of whether a dis-
position has occurred within the meaning of section I 00 I is to a 
considerable degree a function of whether the imposition of a tax 
is "appropriate"; since the standards for judging appropriateness are 
vague, there is considerable room for changes in judicial and Treas-
ury attitude. Second, the emergence of the warrant as a distinct junior 
equity security264 puts some strain on the purchase theory of non-
realization. The modern view that warrants raise permanent capital 
262. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1232(b)(2); Treas. Reg. § l.1232-3(b)(2)(i) (19GB). 
263. Theoretically, the Treasury's revenues should be about the same for bond-
warrant units and convertible debentures despite their disparate treatment under 
section 1232. With a convertible sold at issue for its redemption price at maturity, 
the issuer gets no interest expense deduction and the bondholder has no ordinary 
income. With the bond-warrant unit the issuer will have an annual deduction for 
original-issue discount and under present law the bondholder would very often, but 
not always, have ordinary income in a comparable amount; it would occasionally 
be less than the issuer's deduction. 
Congress' handling of convertible debentures avoids the mismatch in revenues and 
deductions which occasionally accompanies bond-warrant units, and it minimizes admin-
istrative burdens to taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service. It is also consistent 
with the accounting profession's at least temporary resolution of a considerable con• 
troversy concerning whether the issuer should value the option inherent in the con• 
version feature and deduct any resulting bond discount as an interest expense, These 
substantial considerations of expediency go a long way toward justifying a provision 
that is conceptually unjustifiable. 
264. See text accompanying notes 150-56 supra. 
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and that a major portion of the warrant's purpose is achieved upon 
sale of the bond-warrant units, plus the fact that warrants possess 
trading features unlike other securities-the unique premium or 
leverage value-combine to give a new significance to the issuance 
and trading of warrants; the more the warrant is thought of as 
separate from the common stock, the more "appropriate" it would 
be to make the warrant's exercise a taxable event. Third, as a conse-
quence of an amendment to section 305, questions have arisen about 
the present validity of certain aspects of Palmer.265 While the pur-
chase theory presently appears to be unaffected by these develop-
ments, any re-examination of Palmer could be significant. 
The open-transaction theory appears to fit warrants, but it is a 
weak alternative to the purchase theory. A shift to common stock 
from the warrant, which has value only because of its claim on the 
underlying common, seems much more like the change in form con-
templated by the open-transaction theory than is the conversion 
from bond to stock presently countenanced by that theory. Never-
theless, the questionable application of the form-versus-substance 
distinction leaves the force of the open-transaction theory in doubt. 
In addition, the purchase theory has a stronger judicial anchor than 
the open-transaction theory: the Supreme Court articulated it and 
two courts of appeals have 
I 
refined it, while the open-transaction 
theory is a Treasury pronouncement and nothing more. 
The recapitalization theory governing convertible preferred stock 
is a second and quite sound alternative. Section 354 provides, in part, 
that if as part of a "reorganization" as defined in section 368, "stock 
or securities" of a particular company are exchanged for stock of 
that company, no gain or loss shall be recognized. Assuming for the 
moment that exercise of warrants would be a "recapitalization" 
under section 368(a)(l)(E) and therefore a "reorganization,''266 the 
critical issue becomes whether warrants are "stock or securities." 
Neither term is defined by Congress. It was left to the courts to shape 
their meaning. While nonassignable warrants to buy stock have been 
treated as stock on the theory that no other consideration can be re-
ceived for them,267 the Treasury has taken the position that transfer-
265. See Gordon v. Commissioner, 391 U.S. 83, 89-90 n.4 (1968); Carlson, Taxation 
of "Taxable" Stock Rights: The Strange Persistence of Palmer v. Commissioner, 23 TAX 
L. REv. 129 (1968). 
266. See text accompanying notes 295-98 infra. 
267. Rev. Rul. 66-112, 1966-1 CUM. Buu.. 68; Rev. Rul. 66-366, 1966-2 CUM. Buu.. 194. 
These rulings pertain to section 368, but that section is so closely identified with section 
354 that the term "stock" should have a like meaning in both provisions. 
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able warrants are not stock within the meaning of section 354,208 and 
lower courts have so held.269 Under section 368, which is closely re-
lated to section 354, the Supreme Court has held that transferable 
warrants are not stock.270 The Court reasoned that although the 
warrants could only be exercised to acquire voting stock, the charac-
ter of the instrument at the time of the exchange was controlling, 
and the warrant holder was not then a stockholder. 
With regard to the nmv-critical question of whether the warrant 
is a "security," the answer, though presently ambiguous, should be 
affirmative. The Treasury has taken the position that, for purposes 
of section 354, warrants are not included in the term "securities."271 
In contrast, the Tax Court has held that transferable perpetual war-
rants are securities within the meaning of the identical predecessor 
of section 354(a)(l),272 and it has refrained from deciding whether 
a later limitation on the general rule of section 354(a)(I) operates to 
change the characterization of a warrant as a security.278 
The Supreme Court has not had occasion to address itself to this 
issue, but the Third Circuit in Neville Coke & Chemical Co. v. Com-
missioner214 considered the somewhat analogous question whether 
debt transferred to the corporation was a security, and propounded 
the puzzling thesis that the debt instrument must have a proprietary 
interest prior to transfer to qualify as a security.275 It seems reason-
able to anticipate that a court following Neville Coke would require 
that warrants have a similar proprietary interest prior to exercise in 
order to qualify as a security. No problem should be presented by 
this requirement. Although not free from doubt, recent develop-
ments reinforce the conclusion that warrants represent a proprietary 
268. Treas. Reg. § 1.354-l(e) (1955). The Treasury has held that warrants with none 
of the attributes of immediate stock ownership are not stock for purposes of section 
1372. Rev. Rul. 67-269, 1967-2 CUM. BUIL. 298. 
269. William H. Bateman, 40 T.C. 408, 415 (1963). See E.P. Raymond, 37 B.T.A. 423 
(1938). Cf. Carlberg v. United States, 281 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1960) (Blackmun, J.). 
So-called "warrants" have been held to be stock for purposes of the foreign personal 
holding company provisions when they possess important stock characteristics such as 
rights to dividends and rights to vote at shareholders' meetings. Estate of Nettie Miller, 
43 T.C. 760, 764 (1965). 
270. Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 200 (1942). Cf. 
Helvering v. San Joaquin Fruit &: Inv. Co., 297 U.S. 496 (1936) (option to buy real 
property). 
271. Treas. Reg. § 1.354-l(e) (1955). 
272. E.P. Raymond, 37 B.T.A. 423 (1938), 
273. William H. Bateman, 40 T.C. 408, 415 (1963). 
274. 148 F.2d 599 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 726 (1945). 
275. 148 F .2d at 602. 
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interest. They have been styled "a junior equity security" by the 
SEC and a leading federal court.276 In addition, the accounting pro-
fession, reflecting the evolving attitude of the financial and account-
ing communities, now considers them common stock equivalents.277 
Qualification as a security should not, however, be governed by 
a proprietary test. The notion appears to represent an arrant en-
grafting of the "continuity-of-interest" doctrine,278 which overrides 
the reorganization provisions, onto the term "securities" as it ap-
pears in section 354. Several cases do intertwine problems of defini-
tion with the continuity doctrine,279 but other cases follow the more 
sharply focused and preferable procedure of treating a definitional 
task separately from the question whether the dominant continuity-
of-interest doctrine is satisfied.280 
Since "the words of statutes-including revenue acts-should be 
interpreted where possible in their ordinary, everyday senses,"281 
resolution of the question whether a warrant is a security should re-
flect the terminology of our financial community. This is especially 
appropriate in view of the extensive, highly developed, and populous 
nature of that community. The ordinary warrant is a "security" 
within the meaning of Article 8, Investment Securities, of the Uni-
form Commercial Code,282 and is a security within the registration 
provision of the Securities Act of 1933.283 It is listed on our national 
securities exchanges,284 and the warrant is discussed in basic texts 
on security analysis.285 Moreover, in contrast to its position regard-
ing sections 354 and 368, the Treasury itself assumes that a warrant 
276. See notes 150-56 supra and accompanying text. 
277. See note 135 supra and accompanying text. 
278. See LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 421 (1940); Helvering v. Minnesota Tea 
Co., 296 U.S. 378, 386 (1935); Pinellas Ice&: Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 
462,470 (1933); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 332, 334 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951); Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937, 
940 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933). 
279. Neville Coke &: Chem. Co. v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1945); 
Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932). 
280. LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940); Pinellas Ice &: Cold Storage Co. v. 
Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933); Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 
(1935); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 332 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 
342 U.S. 860 (1951). 
281. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 (1947). Accord, e.g., Commissioner v. 
Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1963); Hanover Bank v. Commissioner, 369 U.S. 672, 687 
(1962). 
282. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-102(1)(a) &: Comment. 
283. See note 11 supra. 
284. See note 2 supra and accompanying text. 
285. See note 70 supra. 
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is a security for purposes of the wash sale provisions. The wash sale 
rules provide in brief that no deduction shall be allowed if, within 
thirty days from the sale or other disposition of "shares of stock or 
securities," the taxpayer acquires substantially identical stock or 
securities.286 Revenue Ruling 56-406, which considers whether sec-
tion 1091 is applicable to a loss sustained "on the sale of warrants 
of the corporation where common stock of the corporation was pur-
chased simultaneously,"287 defines the circumstances where the loss 
will be disallowed. The necessary assumption of the ruling is that 
warrants are stock or securities,288 and, indeed, the Treasury dis-
cusses the relative values and price changes that can "make the war-
rants fully convertible securities."289 Furthermore, the property sub-
jected to the short-sale rules consists only of "stock," "securities," 
and "commodity futures."290 Since warrants are manifestly not com-
modity futures and are not stock,291 their coverage depends on their 
being a "security."292 
Departure from a literal reading of statutory language may on 
occasion be necessary in order to implement the legislative purpose.293 
Possible abuses in the use of warrants, if styled securities, do not 
appear difficult to handle. Issuance of cash equivalents-such as war-
rants callable at an early date or short-term warrants on short-term 
debt-that might threaten to defeat congressional intent can easily be 
dealt with by analogy to those cases in which short-term debt has been 
held not to be a "security."294 Significantly, the standard evolving to 
286. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 109l(a). 
287. Rev. Rul. 56-406, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 523, 524. 
288. The Treasury's position is especially significant since the language of section 
1091 lends some support to an argument that options, including warrants, arc not 
securities. Congress separately mentioned "stock," "securities," and an "option to 
acquire" stock or securities in section 1091. The separate mention arguably suggests 
options and securities are separate. The Treasury's interpretation appears the more 
reasonable alternative. 
289. Rev. Rul. 56-406, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 523-24 (emphasis added). 
290. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 1233(e)(2). 
291. See notes 268-70 supra and accompanying text. 
292. There appears to be no case or Treasury pronouncement explicitly discussing 
the relationship between section 1233 and warrants. However, Treas. Reg. section 
1.1233-l(d)(l) (1967) provides that "[i]n general, as applied to stocks and securities, the 
term [substantially identical property] has the same meaning as the term 'substantially 
identical stock or securities' used in section 1091 ••• ," Thus Revenue Ruling !iG-406, 
note 287 supra, and its implications become germane. Furthermore, it is not reasonable 
to suppose that Congress intended short sales of listed warrants to be excluded from 
section 1233. Inclusion carries the necessary implication that they are stock or securities. 
293. See, e.g., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 
441, 446-48 (1947). 
294. See, e.g., Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933) 
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govern these cases places stress on the continuity-of-interest doctrine, 
not on the term "security."295 Where already outstanding warrants 
on common stock are being exercised, there are no apparent oppor-
tunities for abuse if warrants are considered securities. However, 
there might be an appropriate distinction between tendering and 
receiving a warrant in resolving whether there is a continuity of 
interest.296 
An implication of viewing warrants as securities is that if issued 
as part of a transaction that qualifies as a reorganization under section 
368, they would not be treated as other property, or so-called "boot," 
within the meaning of sections 354 and 356. Therefore, there might 
be a small increase in the use of warrants, particularly since advance 
rulings are common in the reorganization area. 
It was assumed earlier that exercise of a warrant was a recapitali-
zation within the meaning of 368(a)(l)(E) and therefore a reorganiza-
tion.297 That assumption now needs to be verified. The term "re-
capitalization" is not defined in the Code, and the development of 
its metes and bounds has also been left to the Treasury and judiciary. 
Generally speaking, it involves "a reshuffiing of a capital structure, 
within the framework of an existing corporation."298 It encompasses 
exchanges by a corporation's security holders of one class of stock 
or securities for another class issued by the same corporation.299 
Exercise of a warrant would appear to qualify as a recapitaliza-
tion, although no cases have yet confronted the issue. Exercise of 
warrants reshuffies the capital structure, for the shares of common 
outstanding are increased. The business-purpose criterion300 is easily 
satisfied by the capital-raising consequence of exercise. With regard 
to continuity of interest, the problem historically troubling the 
courts and the Treasury has involved situations in which the in-
terest before exercise was arguably more substantial than the interest 
(debt was payable within four months); Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 
60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933) (fourteen months); 
Margorie Fleming Lloyd-Smith, 40 B.T.A. 214 (1939), affd., 116 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1941) 
(two years). 
295. See LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940). 
296. See text accompanying note 301 infra. 
297. See text accompanying note 266 supra. 
298. Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 202 (1942). Accord, 
United Gas Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d 216, 219 (3d Cir. 1944), 
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 739 (1945); Commissioner v. Neustadt's Trust, 131 F.2d 528, 529 
(2d Cir. 1942). 
299. See B. Bl'ITKER &: J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND 
SHAREHOLDERS § 14.17 (3d ed. 1971). 
300. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). 
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after exercise.301 The exercise of warrants is particularly compatible 
with the continuity test since the warrant holder advances to the 
position of a full-fledged shareholder with the associated voting and 
other ownership rights. Indeed, there is not only continuity, but 
an increase in the warrant holder's interest. Where receipt of war-
rants would decrease one's proprietary interest-as where common 
stock was surrendered for warrants-the continuity-of-interest test 
might preclude qualification as a reorganization. 
A possible objection to viewing exercise as a recapitalization 
might be that the reshuffling associated with recapitalization con-
templates not just an increase in one component of a corporation's 
capital structure, but a decrease in another component as well. As-
suming this to be so, the warrant's exercise should still qualify. Ac-
counting practice has moved decidedly in the direction of reflecting 
warrants in the capital structure of the company, a practice not 
heretofore followed.302 Moreover, since the term recapitalization has 
not been defined by Congress and the courts have indicated the term 
is to be given a broad meaning,303 evolution in that meaning to 
include exercise of warrants would seem appropriate. 
The recapitalization theory of nonrecognition presently govern-
ing the exercise of convertible preferred stock appears to be a viable 
alternative theory for concluding that exercise of warrants is a non-
ta.xable event. 
IV. ISSUER'S PERSPECTIVE 
The aspects of warrants that are of particular financial and cor-
porate law significance to the issuer have been identified in prior 
sections of this Article. Certain tax consequences have also been 
previously identified, but several important tax points remain and 
must now be considered. Analysis of these points suggests that is-
suance and exercise of the warrant element of a bond-warrant unit 
are nontaxable events to the issuing corporation. Expiration poses a 
more difficult question, but on balance it should also be a nontaxable 
event. 
Three alternative theories support the conclusion that the is-
301. See, e.g., LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940); Pinellas Ice &: Cold Storage 
Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-l(b) (1955). 
302, APB Op. No. 14, supra note 87. 
303. See Commissioner v. Edmonds' Estate, 165 F.2d 715, 718 (3d Cir, 1948); 
Commission v. Neustadt's Trust, 131 F.2d 528, 530 (2d Cir. 1942): Alan 0, Hickock, 
32 T.C. 80, 87 (1959); Penfield v. Davis, 105 F. Supp. 292, 303 (N.D. Ala. 1952), affd,, 
205 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1953). 
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suance of the warrant element of a bond-warrant unit is a nontaxable 
event. Under a nonrealization theory, issuance is a nonrealization 
event by analogy to the purchase theory and its continuing-offer 
premise;304 essentially, the option is a preliminary and subsidiary 
event in a transaction ultimately directed toward the sale of stock. 
Because the accomplishment of this purpose depends upon the war-
rant's subsequent exercise, the most "appropriate occasion"305 for 
considering the question of gain (or loss) is either exercise or ex-
piration. 
The second theory for viewing issuance as a nontaxable event 
is found in the exemption from recognition provided by section 1032. 
That section dictates nonrecognition when a corporation receives 
money or other property in exchange for "stock" of such corpora-
tion.306 Although the legislative history is somewhat skimpy, the 
congressional purpose behind this provision was apparently to permit 
corporations to raise permanent equity capital without paying a tax 
on that equity. Under the modern view that a warrant is a security 
for raising such permanent equity capital, its issuance is within the 
ambit of the congressional purpose; permanent capital is raised upon 
sale of warrants, and neither the subsequent exercise nor expiration 
changes that fact. The obstacle to the application of section 1032 to 
the issuance of warrants is the requirement that "stock" be exchanged 
for the money or property. As elsewhere in the Code, the term stock 
is not defined in section 1032; as a result, it has fallen to the courts 
to interpret that section. Some authorities have held that warrants 
are not stock under sections 354 and 368.307 The significance of these 
holdings to the issuance of warrants under section 1032 is in doubt, 
however, given the different purposes of the provisions. The increas-
ing acceptance of warrants as junior equity securities and the ap-
parent purpose of section 1032 not to tax permanent equity suggest 
that warrants should be viewed as stock for the purposes of section 
1032. 
The final theory for viewing issuance as a nontaxable event is 
based on section 118, which excludes from gross income "any con-
tribution to the capital" of the corporation.308 This phrase is not 
804. See text accompanying notes 226-44 supra. 
305. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 68 (1962). See text accompanying note 237 
supra. 
306. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1032(a). 
307. See notes 268-70 supra and accompanying text. 
808. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 118(a). 
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defined in the Code, but it is clear that both stockholders and non-
stockholders can make such a contribution, and it is also apparent 
that a dominant factor in characterizing a transaction is the motive, 
purpose, or intent of the conttibution.309 The requisite motive un-
der section 118 is different from the motive underlying a gift; but 
while the expectation of indirect, remote, or general benefits is per-
missible, 310 a benefit in the form of the immediate receipt of goods 
or services negates the idea of a contribution to capital.311 Concern-
ing situations between the two extremes, it has been observed that 
the acquisition of an interest in a corporation or the increase of one's 
equity is evidence of a contribution to capital;312 thus, it is permis-
sible to anticipate the future benefit attending a successful invest-
ment. The Regulations mention four criteria in determining an 
acceptable motive for contributions to capital by stockholders: a 
need by the corporation for additional capital, the voluntary nature 
of the contribution, the crediting of the contribution to surplus or 
a special account, and a showing that the contribution was not in 
consideration for goods or services.313 Given the financing purpose 
of the corporate issuer of bond-warrant units and the warrant hold-
er's expectation of gain through appreciation in the underlying 
common stock, all four of the Treasury's criteria would appear to 
be met. There is no relevant practical difference between a stock-
holder paying an additional price for stock already owned as com-
pared to a nonstockholder paying that additional price-through the 
mechanism of purchasing an option-before a possible stock pur-
chase. 
Qualification under section 118 apparently would have an im-
portant side effect in the typical case where warrants are sold to 
309. United Grocers, Ltd. v. United States, 308 F.2d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 1962), 
310. Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 339 U.S. 583 (1950); United Grocers, 
Ltd. v. United States, 308 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1962): S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 190, 
at 190. 
Although section 118 had no counterpart in prior tax codes, the legislative history 
evidences the intent to codify then existing law exempting from ta.\'.ation voluntary 
contributions for reasons other than the receipt of goods or services. S. REP. No. 1622, 
supra note 190, at 190. Consequently, analogous cases such as Brown Shoe are germane. 
For a discussion of section 118 and the relevant cases before and after its enactment, 
see Landis, Contributions to Capital of Corporations, 24 TAX L. REv. 241 (1969); 
Note, Taxation of Nonshareholder Contributions to Corporate Capital, 82 HARV, L. 
REv. 619 (1969). 
311. Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98, 102 (1943): Teleservice Co, v. 
Commissioner, 254 F.2d 105, 110 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 919 (1958); Treas, Reg, 
§ 1.118-1 (1956). 
312. United Grocers, Ltd. v. United States, 308 F.2d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 1962), 
313. Treas. Reg. § 1.118-1 (1956). 
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nonstockholders or to_ investors who are only coincidentally stock-
holders. Since at the time of warrant purchase a warrant holder 
would not thereby become a stockholder, under section 362 the 
corporation's basis for the property acquired with the money re-
ceived for the warrant would be reduced by the amount of the 
contribution.314 Should this purchased property be a depreciable 
asset, the corporation is avoiding tax on the money paid for the 
warrant at ordinary-income rates in the year of the contribution, but 
forgoing the depreciation deduction against ordinary income in 
years subsequent to the warrant's issuance. Thus, qualification under 
section 118 does not eliminate, but merely postpones, the tax and 
-since a capital asset may be purchased with the contribution-
creates the possibility that the subsequent tax will be at capital-gain 
rather than ordinary-income rates. 
Exercise of a warrant is also a tax-free event to the corporation. 
Alternative theories again support a common result. The analogy to 
the purchase theory of nonrealization is feasible, and a contribution 
to capital has arguably occurred. But section 1032 is more certain 
than these alternative theories: exercise falls within the plain mean-
ing of the statute; stock has been issued in return for money or other 
property.315 
Expiration of the unexercised warrant poses the most difficult 
problem for the corporate issuer. The Treasury has taken the posi-
tion that the grantor of an option has ordinary income in the amount 
of his gain when the option expires unexercised.316 As written, this 
regulation appears to reach the corporate issuer of warrants. How-
ever, there are practical and statutory reasons why this regulation, 
although applicable to writers of calls,317 should not be applied to 
corporate issuers of warrants. In contrast to the corporation that 
issues warrants, the writer of a call makes no new capital available 
to the corporation. Consequently, while the call writer has-by 
analogy to the purchase theory and its continuing-offer premise-the 
benefit of a nonrealization theory when the call is granted, there is 
no nonrecognition or exclusion (from gross income) provision ex-
empting from taxation either the grant of a call or its expiration. 
The corporate issuer, on the other hand, can rely on either section 
118 or section 1032 to immunize expiration against taxation. 
314. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 362(c)(2). 
315. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 1032(a). 
316. Treas. Reg. § 1.1234-l(b). See Rev. Rul. 58-234, 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 279; Rev. Rul. 
57-40, 1957-1 CUM, Buu.. 266. 
317. See text accompanying note 37 supra. 
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Under the previously considered theory that realization did not 
occur at issuance,318 the subsequent event-expiration-marks the 
end of the transaction and thus would ordinarily trigger realization; 
it thus poses the question whether a nonrecognition provision is then 
operative. Section ll8 may insulate the transaction from taxation 
on the theory that the funds previously received for the warrant have 
been contributed to the capital of the corporation and are therefore 
excluded from gross income. Arguing that issuance was a nonrecogni-
tion event (which presupposes realization) under section 1032310 
would also make the subsequent expiration a nonta.xable event: at 
the time of issuance, neither the question of realization nor the 
consideration of recognition had been deferred to expiration. More-
over, expiration itself provides no new funds, and the event in no 
way changes the corporation's responsibility to the funds already 
received. Consequently, there is no new realization event at expira-
tion, and the nonrecognition protection already afforded by section 
1032 is not terminated since the reasons for the section's application 
at issuance have not been changed by expiration. 
Two problems of ta.-x: consequence to the issuer remain to be 
considered: the treatment of bond-issue discount and use of bond• 
warrant units in corporation acquisitions. Upon sale of a bond-
warrant unit, the funds determined as paid for the bond are not 
subjected to taxation at the time of receipt.320 When the issuance of 
such units results in the bonds being deemed issued with original-
issue discount, this discount is usually amortized ratably over the 
life of the bond as an interest expense deduction.321 A limitation is 
placed, however, on the issuer's deduction of bond discount when 
the bond is retired prior to maturity: if the price paid to retire the 
bond is less than the total of the issue price plus original-issue dis-
count already deducted, the difference is income in the year of the 
repurchase;322 on the other hand, if the repurchase price exceeds 
the issue price as adjusted for the deductible discount, the difference 
is a deductible expense for the issuer. 823 It follows from the forgoing 
318. See text accompanying notes 304-05 supra. 
319. See te.xt accompanying notes 306-07 supra. 
320. See Treas. Reg. § l.61-12(c)(l)-{5) (1968). Cf. Treas. Reg. § l.163-3(a) to (b) 
(1968). 
321. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-3 (1968). Cf. Treas. Reg. § l.61-12(c)(7) (1968). A minor 
nuisance associated with such discount is the obligation the issuer has to inform the 
registered owner of the bond of the amount of the discount. INT. REV. ConE of 1054, 
§ 6049(a), (c). 
322. Treas. Reg. § l.61-12(c)(3) (1968). 
323. Treas. Reg. § l.163-3(c)(l) (1968). 
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that the unamortized discount is deductible neither ratably in the 
years following retirement, nor in full in the year of redemption. 
The second deduction limitation arises when bond-warrant units 
are used in corporate acquisitions and the debt qualifies as corporate 
acquisition indebtedness under section 279; interest in excess of the 
statutorily permitted amount is not deductible.324 When section 279 
operates to preclude the issuer from deducting the stated interest on 
the bond, it is not clear whether it also prevents deduction of the 
interest imputed under section 1232. Original-issue discount, while 
like interest in some respects,325 seems different from stated interest. 
It is nowhere styled interest in section 1232, and it is meaningfully 
different from interest in a financial sense: there is an annual cash 
outflow for stated interest that is required by contract, whereas there 
is no disbursement for imputed interest expense. On the other hand, 
whether the interest expense is imputed or actual, the tax result is 
the same when a deduction is taken. Moreover, the yield theory, 
which appears to underlie section 1232,326 considers the discount as 
interest in a theoretical sense, and the Treasury, through the Regula-
tions, appears to view the issuer's deduction as interest expense.327 
Finally, Congress' intent in enacting section 279 was to discourage 
debt-financed acquisitions by denying an interest expense deduction 
when classic security analysis concepts for determining acceptable 
debt risk are violated;328 permitting the deduction would thwart this 
objective. Thus, the deduction limitation of section 279 should be 
viewed as applicable to original-issue discount in bond-warrant units. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Four decades have elapsed since warrants were last used in 
volume and discussed in detail in legal literature. Their significant 
use in public financing has made it appropriate to reassess the 
instrument, especially since the financial, legal, and accounting en-
vironment today has changed in some meaningful respects from its 
state in the early 1930's. 
324, INT. R.Ev. CoDE of 1954, § 279(a). 
325. See note 190 supra and accompanying text. 
326. See text accompanying notes 192-96 supra. 
327, Although the Treasury discusses the deductability by the issuer of bond dis-
count in the regulations under the interest expense provision, Treas. Reg. § 1.163-3 
(1968), it is interesting that the discussion nowhere refers to "interest" income or 
"interest" expense. 
328. Compare GRAHAM &: DODD, 4th ed., supra note 35, at 324-63, with INT. REv. 
CODE of 1954, § 279(b)-(c). 
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In view of earlier authoritative criticism of warrant use, the most 
basic and pertinent question for issuers and their shareholders is 
whether the issuance of warrants (typically as an element in a bond-
warrant unit) is on balance beneficial to their interests. Past criticism 
of warrants has basically been legitimate but too sweeping. In par-
ticular, there has been inadequate perception of the benefits received 
by existing shareholders. Whereas some early legal ·writers saw the 
warrant as a device whereby the holder got something for nothing, 
the gross benefit received from its issuance in a bond-warrant unit is, 
at a minimum, the present value, after tax, of the cash interest 
saved; and the benefit can be substantially higher when the option's 
leverage value permits its sale at a price in excess of the present value 
of the cash interest saved. Indeed, the warrant is today a junior 
· equity security issued as a means of raising permanent capital both 
at initial sale and subsequently at exercise. When compared to 
financing alternatives, there are circumstances today in which the 
bond-warrant unit's effect on cash flow, risk, and reported earnings 
(and through reported earnings, on the common stock's market price) 
makes that unit the optimal financing choice. 
As a consequence of the misunderstanding of the possible benefits 
of warrants to stockholders, there was inadequate focus on taming 
the warrant-that is, eliminating its abuses while retaining its bene• 
fits. More recently, the financial community-issuers, underwriters, 
stock exchanges, and accountants--have acted with increasing under-
standing and wisdom. The quantum of warrants issued relative to 
the outstanding stock of any particular issuer has remained low. The 
lives of warrants have usually been kept short, generally within five 
to ten years. The stated exercise price has usually been at market or 
above, not below. Somewhat tardily, the problem of potential dilu-
tion has been addressed and provisions made for improving dis-
closure. These practices should be continued. Conversely, the highly 
questionable use of perpetual and other long-lived warrants and the 
issuance of large numbers of warrants relative to the outstanding 
common stock should be avoided. The realization that pragmatically 
the warrant is a junior equity security argues that state statutory 
law should require that issuance of all warrants, but certainly those 
with a life of twenty years or more, be authorized by shareholders 
in the same manner as common stock and preferred stock. 
From the holder's perspective the major legal issues relate to tax 
treatment, with the desirability of legislative protection of certain 
basic expectations being a secondary topic. Regarding the latter, too 
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few cases involving recent warrants have been decided to predict 
whether modem courts will manifest the hostility of an earlier age 
or a new amity toward the warrant holder. As cognizance that war-
rant holders are not necessarily corporate parasites and that the is-
suance of bond-warrant units can be in the shareholders' interests 
increases, a willingness to protect the warrant holder's rights seems 
likely to appear also. By anticipating problems, state legislatures 
could, through more definitive legislation, assist attorneys in pro-
tecting warrant holders from possible abuse. Reputable issuers and 
their advisors, aware that a warrant holder's rights depend upon 
his contract, have been at pains to protect him against dilution and 
changes in corporate circumstances that could terminate or seriously 
defeat his reasonable expectations without compensation. Investors 
·will come to expect these basic contractual protections, and indeed 
they probably have done so already. The basic protections should 
be codified to avoid their inadvertent or intentional omission. 
In the income tax area, Congress has for questionable reasons 
imposed a surprisingly harsh tax burden upon the individual cash.:-
basis purchaser of a bond-·warrant unit. The warrant itself is not 
directly affected, but the bond element of the unit is. One may 
surmise that as investors come to appreciate their annual-income 
responsibility for imputed interest on original-issue discount bonds, 
such bonds will be less attractive to investors relative to bonds with-
out such a discount. This factor, which was intended to reduce 
the use of units in mergers, will lessen the unit's attractiveness 
to investors in all circumstances. 
The justification for treating exercise of long-term equity options 
as nonta.xable events resides in a variety of theories. The treatment 
of warrants is well grounded in the purchase theory, which as inter-
preted appears to owe its force to common law contract theory. The 
rationale justifying the treatment of exercise as a nontaxable event is 
a pivotal tax principle, and its underlying rationale should be shifted 
from common law contract theory to a more practical justification-
the purpose and realities of corporate financings. Moreover, should 
the purchase theory of nonrealization lose vitality, a proper alterna-
tive rationale could be found in the reorganization theory of non-
recognition presently governing the exercise of convertible preferred 
stock. 
From the issuer's perspective, tax questions are especially rele-
vant. Issuance, exercise, and expiration may be nontaxable events 
to the corporate issuer of warrants under one or a combination of 
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theories presented above. These theories have practical as well as 
theoretical significance since different tax ramifications flow from 
several of the alternatives. 
As one assesses the warrant's basic character, its use today, and the 
posture of the law surrounding that use, it seems clear that several of 
the legal implications of issuing, owning, and selling warrants are in 
a state of flux, while others are tenuously based, or of questionable 
validity. The time is propitious for Congress and state legislatures to 
take a fresh look at the instrument and make legislative adjustments 
that would rationalize and clarify its status. Only this will give direc-
tion and meaning to the evolution in the use and perception of war-
rants that has occurred since the 1930's. 
